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Congressional Authority to Induce
Waivers of State Sovereign Immunity:
The Conditional Spending Power
(and Beyond)
by MICHAEL T. GIBSON*
I. State Sovereign Immunity vs. American Business
A. State Sovereign Immunity Invades Silicon Valley
Supporters of state sovereign immunity eventually will rue June
23, 1999. On that day, the Supreme Court's conservative justices
seemingly produced three triumphs for states' rights.' In Alden v.
Maine, they revealed that sovereign immunity protects States from
suits in federal and state courts.2 In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,3 they let a state
intentionally infringe upon a federal patent without fear of monetary
liability.4 In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, they let the same state violate a federal
trademark with the same impunity In all three cases, they said that
Congress could not use Article I to abrogate state sovereign
Professor, Oklahoma City University School of Law; BA, University of Nebraska; JD,
Yale University. I am grateful to my colleague, Andrew Spiropoulos, for his comments.
1. The conservative wing of the Supreme Court consists of Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas.
2. 527 U.S. 706, 712, 735-40 (1999). In contrast, the Eleventh Amendment limits
only the "judicial power of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
3. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
4. Id. at 653, 653 n.4, 654 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissent pointed
out the losing plaintiff had alleged that the state of Florida had willfully infringed its
patent.
5. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
[439]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
immunity.6
This article will argue that two aspects of the Alden trilogy
authorize Congress to substantially limit State sovereign immunity.
First, Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank gave opponents of
states' rights a powerful new ally: corporate America.7 Even as state
university hospitals, state research laboratories, and state university
think-tanks blossomed,8 those cases exempted states from following a
variety of federal laws passed under the Commerce Clause9 and
effectively required American businesses to compete against state-
owned enterprises which can ignore a wide range of federal laws
without risking monetary liability." As the 21st century began,
6. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 730-35; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636; Coll. Say. Bank, 527
U.S. at 672.
7. Before June 23rd, 1999, mainstream American businesses had lost only three state
sovereign immunity cases since the appointment of Justice Rehnquist in 1974. See P. R.
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (architecture firm);
Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989) (bankruptcy trustee for
nursing home); Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass., 450
U.S. 147 (1981) (association of nursing homes and hospitals). Two of those losses could
have been prevented by an attorney who had taken a decent course in Federal
Jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 27 to 35.
A fourth case involved a business outside the normal flow of commerce. Fla. Dept. of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (Stevens, J., plurality) (treasure
hunter's claim to gold and jewels found in a sixteenth-century Spanish shipwreck).
8. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 656-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing state
university patent activity and citing Kenneth S. Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus:
Commercialization of University-Developed Biomedical Technologies, 52 FoOD & DRUG
L.J. 453 (1997)).
9. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-36 (Commerce power does not override state
sovereign immunity); Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676-84 (State's business activity in area
regulated by Congress does not constructively waive its immunity).
10. New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1243
(E.D. Cal. 1999) ("[A] State engaging in no more than ordinary business activities enjoys a
substantial edge over its competitors: total immunity from suit in federal court, an
immunity even more impenetrable than that afforded to foreign powers.").
Federal courts have ruled that the following statutes do not abrogate State sovereign
immunity:
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12202; see Bd. of Trs. of
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994 ed. and Supp. (III); see Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000); The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see Alden, 527
U.S. at 711-12; The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(a); see
Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 227-29 (3rd Cir. 2000); Sims v.
Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir.
2000). But see Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F. Supp. 659 (D. Md. 1996) (act trumps
Eleventh Amendment); Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, see
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814, 816, 819 (8th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 958 (2000); The Emergency Medical Treatment and Women
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American businesses found their high-tech interests endangered by a
doctrine based on the medieval notion that monarchs ruled by divine
right."
Moreover, College Savings Bank and Alden gave Congress a
powerful sword to wield on behalf of newly angered corporate
America. Although the Rehnquist Court has increasingly restricted
in Active Labor Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A); see Lebron v. Ashford
Presbyterian Comm'n Hosp., 975 F. Supp. 407 (D.P.R. 1997); Perez-Bourdon v.
Commonwealth, 951 F. Supp. 22 (D.P.R. 1997). The circuits have split on whether § 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), applies to the States. See Kilcullen v.
N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (listing cases).
11. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[C]enturies ago the belief that the monarch served by divine right made it
appropriate to assume that redress for wrongs committed by the sovereign should be the
exclusive province of still higher authority."); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare of Mo. v. Dep't Of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo., 411 U.S. 279, 323 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our discomfort with sovereign immunity, born of systems of
divine right that the Framers abhorred, is thus entirely natural."). See also John Paul
Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1993) (concept of divine
right consistent with belief of English monarchs "that they were answerable only to God
for their sins.").
The doctrine of divine right claimed that since a king's authority came directly from God,
kings were not accountable to any earthly authority, much as sovereign immunity frees
states from being held accountable in federal court. 4 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA (Micropedia) 132 (15th ed. 1998) (Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., Chicago).
Great Britain extinguished the concept of divine right in the Glorious Settlement of 1689,
in which Parliament acknowledged William and Mary as King and Queen but insisted that
they agree to respect certain rights of Parliament and individual citizens. See G.M.
TREVALYAN, THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 73-77, 81-82 (Oxford University Press 1974).
Two other medieval concepts have links to sovereign immunity. First, the Court has
suggested that sovereign immunity originated in the English feudal system, in which no
lord could be sued by one of his subjects. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414-15 (1979).
Second, sovereign immunity has much in common with kingship by hereditary right. Both
concepts contend that courts lack power over the sovereign. Compare 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 235 (photo reprint, Univ.
of Chicago Press, 1979) (1765) ("no [sluit or action can be brought again[s]t the king, even
in civil matters, becau[s]e no court can have juri[s]diction over him .... ") with U.S.
CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State .... "). In addition, both concepts regard the sovereign
as above the people and the court system; they place great importance on the dignity of
the sovereign. Compare BLACKSTONE at 234 ("First, then, of the royal dignity .... The
law therefore a[s]cribes to the king, in his high political character, not only large powers
and emoluments which form his prerogative and revenue, but likewi[s]e certain attributes
of a great and tran[s]cendent nature; by which the people are led to consider him in the
light of a [sluperior being, and to pay him that awful re[s]pect, which may enable him with
greater ea[s]e to carry on the bu[s]ine[s]s of government.") with Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
44, 58 (1996) (sovereign immunity avoids "the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties" (quoting P. R.
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)).
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the power of Congress to abrogate State sovereign immunity, 2 in
those two cases Chief Justice Rehnquist and all of his colleagues,
conservative and liberal alike, recognized that a Congress with
sufficient political will (or sufficient pressure from the business
lobbyists), may purchase what it cannot abrogate. All nine justices
agreed that Congress may use its Spending Power to condition a grant
of federal funds upon a State's waiver of its immunity to lawsuits filed
by the private beneficiaries of that grant.3 Even more, in College
Savings Bank, the Court's five most conservative justices authorized
Congress to go beyond the Spending Power, saying that Article I's
Compact Clause 4 lets Congress condition a non-monetary grant
(approval of an interstate compact) upon the participating States'
waivers of immunity. 5 In other words, American business now can
encourage Congress to set a price-monetary or otherwise - on a
State's use of sovereign immunity.
How far can Congress -- under pressure from business - take
these powers? Does Article I's Intellectual Property clause 6 let
Congress condition State access to federal patent protection upon a
State's waiver of immunity to claims that it has violated privately-held
patents? Does the Bankruptcy Clause let Congress favor a debtor's
business creditors over the tax collectors of a State that has not
waived its immunity in federal bankruptcy courts? 7
Moreover can Congress use this same technique to protect
individual Americans? For the quarter-century before the Alden
12. Compare Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(Article I's Commerce Clause permits Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity)
with Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 60-73 (overruling Union Gas and finding that Article I's
Indian Commerce Clause does not let Congress abrogate state sovereign immunity).
Compare also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (Section 5 of Fourteenth
Amendment allows Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity) with City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532, 533 (1997) (Congress can use its § 5 abrogation authority only if
it can show "there is reason to believe that many of the [state] laws affected ... have a
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional" and that there is "a proportionality or
congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.").
13. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.); Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,,
C.J., and Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, JJ.; and Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 704
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, JJ.).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
15. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 687 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Thomas, JJ).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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trilogy, the Court's concern for the dignity of states8 took its toll on
those least able to pay the price: disadvantaged or working-class
citizens whose livelihoods were at stake because a state had violated
their civil rights. 9 Under the Commerce Clause, could Congress
trade some of the regulatory authority it now gives states over
18. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715, 748-49 (states retain dignity of sovereignty, "not
becoming" that private citizens may "summon" states to federal court); Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 58 (Eleventh Amendment prevents "indignity" of private citizen suing state);
P. R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)
(Eleventh Amendment prevents indignity of subjecting state to coercion of courts).
19. Edmund Randolph, one of the Constitution's Framers, predicted just such an
outcome. Randolph said that Article III, which created the federal judicial power, was his
favorite part of the Constitution because it would permit suits against states, "secure the
widows and orphans, and prevent the states from impairing contracts. I admire that part
[of Art. III] which forces Virginia to pay her debts." 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION ELLIOT'S DEBATES
at 207 (J. Elliot ed. 1836).
The Court began its use of the Eleventh Amendment at the expense of individuals in 1974,
when newly-appointed Justice William Rehnquist told aged, blind, and disabled citizens
that the Eleventh Amendment allowed their State to violate with impunity federal
regulations intended to provide them money on which to live. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 660-78 (1974).
A decade later, the Court used the Eleventh Amendment to forestall efforts to help
mentally retarded children trapped in a state facility where they were frequently attacked
by staff, injured by fellow residents (or by self-abuse), deprived of basic health care, and
forced to live with "urine and excrement on the walls." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 127 n.1 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also John Paul
Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 N.W. L. REV. 1121 (1993).
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, continued this pattern,
dismissing the claims of a state nurse who was fired for missing work after a lumpectomy,
radiation treatment, and chemotherapy. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). Chief Justice Rehnquist
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred her from suing under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. After describing similar cases,
such as that of a Kansas state microfilmer who was fired because he was deaf, and deaf
workers at the University of Oklahoma who were paid less than those who could hear,
Justice Rehnquist said that states can "quite hard headedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-
hold to job discrimination requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled."
Id. at 367-69.
In addition to those examples, the Court has used the Eleventh Amendment to dismiss
litigation filed by injured workers; see Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S.
30, 33 (1994); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 301 (1990); Welch
v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 471, 472-94 (1987) (disappointed
job seekers); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 236 (1985) (diabetic and
partially-blind job seeker); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 60 (1989)
(police officer seeking promotion and blue collar workers who had lost their jobs); Wis.
Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998) (corrections officer); Livadas v. Bradshaw,
512 U.S. 107, 110, 115 n.9 (1994) (grocery worker seeking back wages); Paschal v.
Didrickson, 502 U.S. 1081 (1992) (denying appeal of claim for unemployment benefits
sought in Paschal v. Jackson, 936 F.2d 940, 940-45 (7th Cir. 1991)).
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20
employment discrimination in return for state waivers of immunity
to privately-filed discrimination lawsuits? More broadly, now that the
nightmares of civil rights activists haunt corporate boardrooms, can
the two groups join to persuade Congress to impose the biggest
condition of them all? Since Congress controls the jurisdiction of the
federal courts,' can Congress once and for all eliminate the costs state
sovereign immunity imposes on American business and American
citizens by conditioning state access (as a plaintiff) to the federal
court system upon a state's blanket waiver of its immunity to all
federal lawsuits?
In short, this article will use the language of the Court's
conservative wing, particularly that of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, to show that the Alden trilogy and other cases
authorize Congress to counteract the Court's seemingly endless
expansion of State sovereign immunity and thereby strike a more
evenhanded balance between state interests in protecting their
sovereignty and federal interests in protecting the rights of all
Americans.
B. The Commercial Aspects of the Eleventh Amendment
1. A mercantile birth and growth
In its first one hundred years, the Eleventh Amendment's ban on
federal court suits against states affected commercial interests, not
personal civil rights. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal courts
could hear only diversity cases.22 This meant that a citizen attainted
by his state's legislature (in violation of Art. I, § 9) had to seek
protection from the courts of that same state, but out-of-state
merchants could use diversity jurisdiction to press their breach of
contract actions in the relative neutrality of federal court.
Furthermore, while the Court said in 1886 that corporations were
"persons" who could use the Fourteenth Amendment to attack State
regulations and taxes,23 not until 1925 would the Court link that
20. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
21. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 and art. III, § 1.
22. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. Federal courts finally received federal question
jurisdiction in 1875. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
23. Santa Clara County v. So. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). Later examples
include Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (invalidating state statute regulating
insurance policies); Mo. Pac. RR. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896) (invalidating state
statute requiring railroads to allow private grain elevators on their property); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (warning that Court had authority to set and enforce limits on
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amendment and the Bill of Rights to protect the civil rights of
"natural persons" from State interference.24 In short, corporations
could ask federal courts for protection against states, while natural
persons could not. Consequently, Eleventh Amendment cases were
limited to business disputes.
Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment sprang from a commercial
dispute. Chisholm v. Georgia let the executor of a South Carolina
businessman sue Georgia for the price of war supplies that State had
purchased,25 prompting the "profound shock" that led to the
amendment's adoption.26  Later, Chief Justice John Marshall's
pronouncements on the Eleventh Amendment involved businessmen
running a national lottery27 and the owners of the first federally-
chartered bank 8
The Eleventh Amendment remained a commercial issue after
the Civil War, when the Court used it to let Southern States escape
liability to thousands of bond holders.29  Later, railroad attacks on
state regulation of their rates produced a series of Eleventh
State regulation of business). See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §11.3, at 411 (WestGroup, 6th ed. 2000) and cases cited.
Professor Orth writes "In one of the cruellest [sic] ironies of American constitutional
history, the central Reconstruction Amendment was converted to the use of business.
Following the Negro's short span in the sun, the corporation enjoyed a long season as the
'special favorite of the laws."' JOHN ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED
STATES 126-27 (Oxford, 1987).
24. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
25. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). The first suit filed in the
Supreme Court's fall 1791 term was by Dutch bankers against the State of Maryland. See
Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401 (1791), cited in Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651,661-62 (1974).
26. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96
(rev. ed. 1926); Alden, 527 U.S. at 720-21; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69; Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. at 10.
27. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 289, 378-92 (1821) (State sovereign
immunity does not bar writ of error from U.S. Supreme Court to Virginia Supreme Court
on indictment by state officials). Marshall referred twice to the Eleventh Amendment by
name, though most of the opinion spoke of State sovereign immunity. Id. at 405,412. Mr.
Barbour, counsel for the defendant in error, repeatedly invoked the Eleventh
Amendment, as did contemporary supporters of Virginia. Id. at 290, 306-07, 315. See G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, in III-IV
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 508-09 (1988) (Note: table of contents does not say
where III ends and IV begins).
28. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 738, 847-59 (1824).
(Eleventh Amendment exempts states from suits by citizens of another state, but federal
court still can hear suit against state agents).
29. E.g., Hans v. Louisiana 134 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1890). For a thorough discussion, see
ORTH, supra note 23, at 58-86.
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Amendment decisions. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
nation's financial and transportation sectors were all too familiar with
State sovereign immunity.
2. A corporate-state balance
The start of the twentieth century produced even more state-
business clashes, requiring the Court to use some creative arguments
to balance corporate interests and state sovereignty.
Did a corporation, contracting with a state, want to preserve its
right to sue for damages? In 1906, Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
let a state waive its sovereign immunity to federal suits," despite the
Eleventh Amendment's apparently absolute ban on such waivers.32
Gunter meant that in-house counsel doing business with the state
could overcome the almighty doctrine of sovereign immunity merely
by inserting a bit of fine print -- a waiver clause - into the contract.
Did an industry oppose state regulations? In 1908, Ex parte
Young said a federal court could enjoin state officials who were
enforcing Minnesota's limits on railroad freight rates.33 Even though
the defendants were state officials obeying the state legislature, the
Court found the lawsuit was not against the state, so the Eleventh
Amendment did not apply.34 Today, the Court recognizes Ex parte
Young as a legal fiction,35 but it was a fiction that balanced the needs
of businesses and states.36
30. E.g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 420 (1894); Smyth v. Ames,
171 U.S. 361 (1898); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537
(1903); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205 (1908).
31. 200 U.S. 273 (1906).
32. Id. at 284. This conflicts with the amendment's text, which flatly says that the
"Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to include" suits against states.
Despite that absolute ban, the Court described Eleventh Amendment immunity as "a
privilege which may be waived ...." ORTH, supra note 23, at 124-26 (quoting Gunter, 200
U.S. at 284).
33. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
34. Id. at 159-60.
35. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269, 270, 281 (1997)
(Kennedy, J.); Pennhurst State Schl. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 n.25 (1984)
("We have noted that the authority-stripping theory of Young is a fiction ....") (Powell,
J.). See also Fla. Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982)
(Stevens, J.) (recognizing "irony" that a state official's conduct is "'state action"' for
purposes of the Fourteenth, but not the Eleventh Amendment).
36. While federal injunctions protected companies against states, states were
protected by the standard requirement that a company had to show imminent, irreparable
injury to get that injunction. See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 380-83
(1992) (requiring proof of irreparable injury in company's effort to obtain injunction to
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What if a state unconstitutionally taxed a corporation? A
company that paid the tax and sought a refund had to ask for
monetary relief from the state treasury, a clear violation of the
Eleventh Amendment. But Young let a company which had not paid
the tax ask a federal court to enjoin state officials from collecting.
Companies so often used this rule to delay tax payments3 7 that the
Court and Congress eventually rebalanced the scales, allowing a state
to use the Eleventh Amendment to bar corporate tax claims only if it
provided adequate remedies for such claims in its own courts.38
Corporate tax attorneys began lobbying state legislatures to adopt
reasonable procedures for contesting taxes, a campaign that produced
mixed results.39
Together, the Court's rules meant that the Eleventh Amendment
was no longer a major problem for business, as long as corporate
counsel took simple precautions-insisting on waivers in contracts
with the state, seeking injunctions before state laws took effect, and
taking advantage of state procedures for contesting taxes.
3. The Modern Clash Between States and Corporate America
a. The gauntlet thrown: Medicaid and bankruptcy statutes
Corporate-state conflicts reemerged in the 1970s as Congress
tested its authority to override the Eleventh Amendment.
The Supreme Court thrice had recognized such an authority. In
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, the Court said
against state).
37. 81 CONG. REC. 1416 (1937) (statement of Rep. Bone) ("tax injunction suits in
federal court let corporations withhold state taxes in such vast amounts and for such long
periods as to disrupt state and county finances .... ).
38. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 524-29 (1932) (federal courts should not
interfere with state tax collection if state law provided an adequate remedy); The Tax
Injunction Act, Act of Aug. 21, 1937, 50 Stat. 738, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Of course,
neither Court nor Congress defined "adequate state remedy." Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l
Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 512-27 (1981) (discussing whether a state remedy system which pays
no interest despite a two-year wait is "plain, speedy, and efficient").
39. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946)
(Utah Code Ann. § 80-5-76 (1943) waives Eleventh Amendment immunity regarding state
court suits for tax refunds); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944) (dismissing
out-of-state insurance company suit against Oklahoma for refund of taxes assessed in
excess of those on in-state companies); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323
U.S. 459 (1945) (dismissing non-resident manufacturer's suit for refund of allegedly
discriminatory taxes); Ga. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952) (state did
not provide "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy," so railroad could sue to block collection
of back taxes).
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Congress could condition its approval of a compact between two
states on their waiver of immunity to suits concerning the bridge they
were building." In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Ala. Docks
Department," the Court said that under the Commerce Clause, a state
that operated a railroad in interstate commerce for twenty years
constructively waived its immunity to federal suits.42 Finally, in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held that section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorized Congress to override the Eleventh
Amendment.43
So armed, Congress and American business attacked state
sovereign immunity on two fronts. First, in 1975, Congress
conditioned federal grants to care for indigent and elderly residents
upon a state's written consent to federal suits brought by the
program's beneficiaries.' A State that did not consent would lose ten
percent of its grant.45 Thirty-four states consented,46 but Congress
quickly (and retroactively!) repealed the provision, with little
explanation.47
After that legislative defeat, nursing homes and hospitals turned
to the federal courts for relief against states determined to reduce
expenses by reducing reimbursement rates. Companies whose
counsel understood Ex parte Young" protected their clients with
federal injunctions that barred State officials from implementing
40. 359 U.S. 275,276-77,280-82 (1959).
41. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478 and n. 8. (1987) and Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680.
42. Id. at 187-197 (discussing the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et
seq).
43. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
44. Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-182, § 111(a), 89 Stat. 1051, 1052, amending
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(g).
45. Id. at § 111(b)(1).
46. H.R. REP. No. 503-19, at 10-11 (App. II) (1976).
47. Act of Oct. 18, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-552, 90 Stat. 2540, amending 42 U.S.C. §§
1396a and 1396b. The House report supporting repeal recounted the inability of some
states to act legislatively in time to meet the statute's deadlines, opposition from state
governors and attorneys general, and legal action by a dozen states, all problems whose
potential should have been obvious at the time of Congress' original vote. H.R. REP. No.
503-19, at 4-5.
The House Report in favor of repeal said twelve states had sued to contest the original
statute's constitutionality, H.R. REP. No. 94-1122, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., May 11, 1976, at 5,
but apparently the rapid repeal mooted the issue. I cannot find a published opinion that
addresses the original statute's constitutionality.
48. See text accompanying notes 29 to 32, supra.
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cutbacks;49 those with less astute counsel lost." One such loser was
the Florida Nursing Home Association, which had foolishly trusted
Florida's written, signed promise to "recognize and abide by all State
and Federal laws, Regulations, and Guidelines applicable to
participation in and administration of the Title XIX Medicaid
program."5'
The second effort to protect business from the Eleventh
Amendment was the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. It used Article I's
Bankruptcy power to prevent states from gaining advantages over a
debtor's private creditors;52 its constitutionality would not be resolved
49. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 505 n.4 (1989); Wash. State Health
Facilities Ass'n v. State of Wash. Dep't of Social & Health Serv., 698 F.2d 964, 965-66 (9th
Cir. 1982); Hillhaven Corp. v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 634 F. Supp. 1313,
1321-23 (E.D. Wis. 1986); Ciampa v. Schweiker, 511 F. Supp. 670, 678 (D. Mass. 1981),
affd, 687 F.2d 518 (1st Cir. 1982); Neb. Health Care Ass'n, Inc. v. Dunning, 578 F. Supp.
543, 545-46 (D. Neb. 1983).
50. See Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 630 F. Supp. 1015, 1019-21 (E.D. Wis. 1986)
(Eleventh Amendment barred recovery of unpaid Medicaid expenses incurred before date
of court order invalidating new rates); Friedman v. Perales, 616 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Eleventh Amendment barred reimbursement for past years' denied
payments); Cal. Ass'n of Bioanalysts v. Rank, 577 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (C.D. Cal. 1983)
(Eleventh Amendment barred retroactive award of Medicaid reimbursement rates which
arose before court order).
Some counsel for Medicaid providers were reduced to arguing that their clients' relief was
prospective (and thus permitted under Edelman), because while their clients had
performed services before the district court judgment date, the injury occurred only when
the clients submitted their bills to the state, which had happened after the district court
judgment. Those counselors lost. See N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp. v. Perales, 50 F.3d
129, 135-37 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Kimble v. Solomon, 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979)); and
Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. Reivitz, 820 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1987).
51. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147,
149-50 (1981). Compare THEODORE S. GEISEL, HORTON HATCHES AN EGG (Random
House, Inc. 1940) (unpaginated) ("I meant what I said, and I said what I meant ...... An
elephant's faithful, one hundred percent.") (ellipsis in original).
52. By including states within the definition of a "governmental unit," the Act said
that a state which filed a claim against a debtor's estate waived immunity to any disputes
arising out of the same transaction as that claim. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a). Otherwise, if the
state and the debtor had mutual breach of contract action against each other, the state
could use the bankruptcy court to collect from the debtor (at the expense of other
creditors) but the bankruptcy court could not enforce even a debtor's valid claim against
the state, again, hurting the creditors who would have divided any sums collected from the
state.
The Act also let bankrupt estates offset against a state government's claim any debts the
government owed it. 11 U.S.C. § 106(b). Obviously, this also protected the debtor's
private creditors by increasing the debtor's asset at the expense of the state.
Finally, the Act expressly bound all "government units" to the bankruptcy court's
decisions. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2). As we shall see later, without this provision, a state
would be tempted to pressure a debtor into paying its state taxes in full, at the expense of
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for a decade.
b. A temporary lull: the 1980s.
Congress next attacked state immunity in 1986. Using the
Commerce Clause, Congress opened states to liability for the costs of
cleaning hazardous waste sites.53 Also in 1986, the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments made states liable under several civil rights statutes.
Two years later, the impending clash between state immunity
and American business appeared in the legal literature. Two Atlanta
attorneys predicted that the Court would use the Eleventh
Amendment to strike down Congressional efforts to expose states to
monetary liability under federal antitrust, copyright; and
environmental statutes.5
The end of the decade produced two inconclusive decisions. A
plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas said that Congress
could use the Commerce Clause to make states liable for harming the
environment. 6 The Court also invalidated the 1978 Bankruptcy Act's
attempt to override the Eleventh Amendment, but only because
Congress had not made sufficiently clear its intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. 7 The first decision obviously was too weak to
private creditors.
53. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, amending the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq. Sections 9604, 9606, and 9607 permitted
the United States to clean up hazardous waste sites and impose the costs on "operators"
responsible for the sites; Section 9601(21) included states within the definition of site
"operators."
54. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, Title X, § 1003,
100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (1986). The amendments abrogated State immunity regarding Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1975, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
55. H. Stephen Harris & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After
Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action
Over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645, 704-17
(1988).
56. Pennsylvania'v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion),
overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 44. Three justices joined Justice
Brennan's opinion. Justice White's concurrence provided the fifth vote for Justice
Brennan's result, but Justice White did not explain how his position differed from the
plurality. Union Gas upheld state liability under the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, § 101(20)(D), amending
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601, 9601(21), 9607(d) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).
57. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96,101 (1989).
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survive long, and the second gave little clue as to what would happen
if Congress spoke more clearly.
c. The growth of state competition with private business
Even as Congress tested its abrogation authority, states entered
business, working with and competing against for-profit enterprise.
In 1980, Congress allowed universities, private and public, to patent
results developed through federally-funded research. 8 Seven years
later, the Library of Congress' Copyright Office formally sought
public commentary about problems that private copyright holders
had enforcing copyright infringement claims against states and the
Eleventh Amendment's effects in copyright infringement cases.5
Since then, university technology departments have become
increasingly commercial.' States are furnishing universities large
sums of money to develop both hardware and software.6
The increasingly commercial nature of state universities extends
beyond intellectual property and computer technology. State
university hospitals compete against private hospitals;62 agricultural
departments at state land grant institutions develop and market
genetically-engineered crops and livestock, as well as pesticides,
herbicides, etc. According to the chief executive officer of the
58. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3019, §§ 200, 202.
59. Request for Information, Eleventh Amendment, 52 Fed. Reg. 42045, 42045 (Nov.
2, 1987).
60. Almost every American research university has an office of technology licensing.
Eyal Press and Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, 285 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 39, 46
(March 2000). Those offices often spend substantial sums on attorneys' fees to protect
their copyrights. Id. at 48. According to the Association of University Technology
Managers, a 300-university consortium devoted to technology transfers, in 1998 alone,
university-produced patents and licenses formed the basis of 364 startup companies. Id. at
46. See also Sonya Colberg, City Drug Company to Sign Production Deal, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN 1-C (Aug. 29, 2001) (announcing $10 million deal with pharmaceutical
company involving technologies developed at University of Oklahoma Health Sciences
Center).
61. For example, former Wisconsin Gov. Tommy G. Thompson (now Secretary of
Health and Human Services for the Bush Administration) asked his state legislature for
$317 million to build several research centers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison;
Illinois Governor George H. Ryan wanted $196 million for biotechnology research at his
state's universities, and California Governor Gray Davis wanted $75 million to create
"Institutes for Science and Innovation" at three campuses of the University of California.
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Feb. 25, 2000, p. A42.
62. See Stein v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 282 N.W.2d 552, 556-59 (Minn. 1979)
(operation of state university hospital was proprietary, not governmental); Hoeffner v.
Univ. of Minn., 948 F. Supp. 1380, 1387 (D. Minn. 1996) (describing how state university
hospital developed and globally distributed drug that reduced transplant rejections).
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National Business Incubation Association, universities now run 150 of
the nation's 600 non-profit business incubators, and she expects every
university to have such an incubator in the next twenty years.63 It was
only a matter of time before state business and private business
clashed.
4. No Prisoners Taken: the 1990s
Between 1990 and 1994, as state competition with private
business increased, Congress invoked its powers under the Patent,
Copyright, and Commerce Clauses to adopt the Remedy Clarification
Acts, making states liable for violations of patents, copyrights, and
trademarks.6' Congress also revised the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to
satisfy the Court's clear statement requirement. 6 Finally, it used the
Indian Commerce Clause to require states to negotiate in good faith
with tribes that wanted to establish casinos.'
The Court responded in 1996. Even though the Indian
Commerce Clause gives Congress plenary and exclusive authority
over tribes, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida said it did not allow
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity.67 If a plenary and
exclusively Congressional power could not override that immunity,
how could any other enumerated power do so? Seminole Tribe
doomed the Remedy Clarification Acts, even though their obituaries
would not appear until June 23, 1999, in Florida Prepaid and College
Savings Bank.
Consequently, we should focus less on the funerals and more on
the mourners. For the first time in a decade, and for only the third
time since Justice Rehnquist joined the Court, mainstream
corporations found themselves on the wrong end of state sovereign
immunity. Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank mean a state
university's agricultural program can pirate a gene-splicing patent; a
state research university can infringe a software copyright; a state
hospital can engage in predatory pricing, all without fear of monetary
63. Martin van der Werf and Goldie Blumenstyk, A Fertile Place to Breed Business,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION, A28 (March 2,2001).
64. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
560, 106 Stat. 4230 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h) and 296(a) (2000)); Trademark
Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1122) (2000). Copyright Remedy Clarification Act Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749,
2749 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 511(a)) (2000).
65. Bankruptcy Act of 1994, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2000).
66. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 102 Stat. 2475,25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
67. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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liability. Injured corporations can use Ex Parte Young to persuade
federal courts to enjoin future violations, but they cannot obtain
monetary relief for injuries already done. Meanwhile, as Professor
Kenneth Klee has written, the two decisions "almost completely
insulate [States] from the power of the bankruptcy courts," leaving
them free to extract preferential payments from debtors at the
expense of the most well-secured creditors.6 Silicon Valley and Wall
Street have a new enemy: state sovereign immunity.
C. New Weapons for the Corporate Arsenal: Conditional Spending (and
Beyond)
Since Congress cannot use Article I's enumerated powers to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, corporate lawyers need a new
approach. This article presents that solution, based largely upon the
work of Chief Justice William Rehnquist. In South Dakota v. Dole,
then-Justice Rehnquist held that Article I's Spending Clause
permitted Congress to do indirectly what it could not do directly.69
He wrote that while the Twenty-first Amendment barred Congress
from directly establishing a national minimum drinking age, Congress
could use its Spending Power to withhold federal highway funds from
states that did not raise their drinking age to twenty-one. °
That approach strongly suggests that Congress can condition
federal grants upon a state's waiver of its sovereign immunity to
private suits involving the administration and implementation of
those grants. For example, Congress should be able to condition
Medicare grants upon a state's waiver of immunity to suit by
Medicare patients.
That idea suggests a second step. If Congress can condition
federal monetary benefits upon a state's waiver of immunity
regarding those benefits, can Congress condition federal non-
monetary benefits upon a similar waiver? For example, can Congress
grant copyrights or patents only to those entities who agree, as a
condition of that protection, to respect and obey the federal courts in
all proceedings involving copyrights or patents?
That second step presents a third. Copyright protection is a
68. Tobacco Company Filings Could Be a Seminole Event, 35 BR. CT. WEEKLY
NEWS AND COMMENT Al, All. (April 25, 2000) (statement of Professor Kenneth Klee).
See also Kenneth N. Klee, James 0. Johnston, and Eric Winston, State Defiance of
Bankruptcy Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1527 (1999).
69. 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
70. Id. at 208-12.
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specific benefit that Congress can extend or retract. What about a
more general benefit, such as access to the independent judges of
federal courts? Could Congress use its Article I powers over the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to condition state access (as a
plaintiff) to federal court upon that state's blanket waiver of its
sovereign immunity regarding all suits filed against it in federal
courts?
In short, might one of state sovereign immunity's great
supporters - Chief Justice Rehnquist - have laid the foundation for
the deconstruction of State sovereign immunity?
II. The Spending Clause vis-a-vis State Sovereign Immunity
A. The Proposal
To aid in assuring that states adhere to the goals of its programs,
Congress should condition financial grants to states upon a waiver, by
statute or constitutional amendment, of a state's sovereign immunity
to suits filed by private parties regarding the funded program.
Congress also should require the lower federal courts to report to the
U.S. Attorney General a state's use of its immunity, enabling the
federal government to determine if a state had violated a waiver.
This section will show four things. First, the Spending Power is
broad enough to encompass this use of federal funds. Second, the
Supreme Court has gone out of its way, albeit in dictum, to say that
conditional spending can overcome state sovereign immunity. Third,
the proposal satisfies South Dakota v. Dole's tests for conditional
spending, and fourth, the lower federal courts repeatedly have
approved this use of conditional spending.
B. The Breadth of the Spending Power
1. The Spending Power and the general welfare
The use of federal funds to encourage states to act began long
before Dole: the Federalist Papers bluntly suggested that the federal
government use its revenues to "attach [State officials] to the Union
by an accumulation of their emoluments.""
As ratified, Article I, Section 8 gave Congress authority "To lay
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 36 (Alexander Hamilton), quoted in Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 914 (1997) (Scalia, J.). Justice Scalia also noted that the first
Congress offered to pay state jailers to house federal prisoners. Act of Sept. 23, 1789, 1
Stat. 96, cited in Printz, 521 U.S. at 909.
[Vol. 29:3
Spring 2002] WAIVERS OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 455
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States. .. ." Section 8 then listed more specific powers, such as
regulating commerce, but it did not say how the powers to Tax and
Spend relate to the enumerated powers. Madison argued that
Congress could tax and spend only to carry out an enumerated
power." Hamilton countered that taxing and spending were separate
powers that Congress could use for any purpose that furthered the
general welfare.73
Congress soon adopted Hamilton's meaning and gave infant
States large sums with strings attached.74 In 1817, for example,
Congress granted the new State of Mississippi five percent of all
proceeds of federal land sales in that State, but only if Mississippi
would pay off the private claimants to that land.75 Congress gave land
to other new states, conditioned on their agreement to use the
revenues from that land to support public schools and a "seminary of
learning, '76 a system that produced today's land-grant universities.
The Conditional Spending power even confronted slavery. In 1832,
U.S. Senator Henry Clay proposed allocating land sale proceeds to
States that would use those funds to buy privately-held slaves and
transport them to Africa.
72. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional
Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN L. REV. 1103, 1112 & n.40 (1987).
73. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66.
74. Early Congressional actions "provide contemporaneous and weighty evidence of
the Constitution's meaning." Alden, 527 U.S. at 743-44 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 905).
75. Act of March 1, 1817, ch. 23, § 5, 3 Stat. 348, 349.
76. Act of April 19, 1816, ch. 57, § 6(1), § 6(4), 3 Stat. 289, 290. See also S. REP. No.
1735, at 1, 2 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3963, 3963 (long practice of Congress
to give States land to support public schools).
77. 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 134 (15th ed. 1998). Ironically, although land
grant universities exist because of federal largesse, some have used state sovereign
immunity to avoid appearing in federal court. See Innes v. Kan. State Univ., 184 F.3d 1275
(10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000); Brine v. Univ. of Iowa, 90 F.3d 271 (8th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1149 (1997); Hoeffner v. Univ. of Minn., 948 F. Supp.
1380 (D. Minn. 1996).
78. SEN. COMMITEE ON MANUFACTURES, 22d CONG., 1st Sess., REPORT ON THE
PUBLIC LANDS (April 16, 1832), reprinted in GALES & SEATON'S REGISTER, APP. 112,
117 ("A portion of the committee would have preferred that the residue should be applied
to the objects of internal improvement and colonization of the free blacks, under the
direction of the General Government. But a majority of the committee believes it better
• . . that the residue be divided among the twenty-four States . . . to be applied to
education, internal improvement, or colonization.., as each State, judging for itself, shall
deem most comfortable .... ).
I uncovered Clay's proposal in WILLIAM W. FREEHLING'S fascinating work, ROAD TO
456 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY ) [Vol. 29:3
Federal conditional grants continued during and after the Civil
War. The 1862 Land Grant bill expressly barred federal educational
funding to any State "in rebellion,"79 and an 1890 statute barred
federal funding for state colleges that rejected students because of
80
race.
Despite conditional spending's long use, the Supreme Court first
discussed this power in United States v. Butler, a 1936 challenge to
federal grants to farmers who reduced production.81 The grants did
not further an enumerated power, but the Court ruled Congress could
spend for any purpose that promoted the general welfare," a position
the Court maintains today. 3
2. Conditional spending and the States
a. In general
A year after Butler approved conditions on federal grants to
individuals, the Court upheld conditions on grants to states. Charles
M. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis approved a federal employment tax
whose proceeds went to states with unemployment compensation
DISUNION: SECCESSIONISTS AT BAY 1776-1854, at 158 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1990).
Freehling says Thomas Jefferson and U.S. Senator Rufus King made similar proposals,
though I cannot tell if they would have distributed the money through the states or
directly to slaveholders. See id. at 156 (citing Jefferson's letter to Gallatin, Dec. 26, 1820,
10 JEFFERSON'S WRITINGS 175-78 (Ford, ed.)). See id. at 159 (citing STATE DOCUMENTS
ON FEDERAL RELATIONS 203-04 (Herman V. Ames, ed. 1906)).
Clay's final proposal did not mention slaves, but it did require states to use the federal
money for specific purposes. S. 179, 22d Congress, 1st Sess., April 16,1832.
79. Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 130, § 5(6), 12, 503, 505 (1862).
80. Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 841, § 1, 26, 417, 418 (1890). The statute said a state
could comply by "equitably dividing" the money between separate colleges for blacks and
whites.
81. 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) ("This court has noticed the question, but has never found it
necessary to decide which is the true construction."). A WESTLAW search produced only
two pre-Butler uses of the phrase "spending power." Neither concerned the federal
government. See Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 514 (1937)
(states' spending power); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 628 (1895)
(farmers' spending power).
82. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66.
83. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (congressional spending power "not limited by the direct grants of legislative
power found in the Constitution.") (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 66); Dole, 483 U.S. at 206
(Congress may use Spending Power "to further broad policy objectives") (quoting
Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Burger, J.); (Spending Power outside of
"Article I's 'enumerated legislative fields,") (quoting Butler, 291 U.S. at 65); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976) (Spending Clause is grant of power): Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (adopting Hamiltonian view of Spending Clause).
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systems that met federal standards. ' Justice Benjamin Cardozo said
that the program violated neither the Tenth Amendment nor
"restrictions implicit in our federal form of government., 85  He
rejected claims that the program coerced states or impaired their
autonomy, 8 saying pressure and persuasion were not the same as
coercion.' And while the program did not create a state-federal
contract," Justice Cardozo wrote:
By this we do not intimate that the conclusion would be
different if a contract were discovered. Even sovereigns may
contract without derogating from their sovereignty.. .The states
are at liberty, upon obtaining the consent of Congress, to make
agreements with one another.. .We find no room for doubt that
they may do the like with Congress if the essence of their
statehood is maintained without impairment... Nowhere in our
scheme of government-in the limitations express or implied of
our Federal Constitution-do we find that she is prohibited
from assenting to conditions that will assure a fair and just
81
requital for benefits received.
Since Steward Machine, the Court repeatedly has upheld Congress'
authority to impose conditions on a wide variety of federal grants to
states.90
b. Methods of federal enforcement
Steward Machine assumed that Congress would enforce its
conditions by simply halting disbursements to states who recanted on
their pledges,91 but in 1983, a unanimous Court broadened that
enforcement authority. Although the Court had long barred private
84. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
85. Id. at 585.
86. See id. at 589.
87. Id. at 589-90.
88. See id. at 596-97 (the program let states opt out at any time).
89. Id. at 597-98 (citations omitted).
90. See, e.g., Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70
(1985) (statute conditioned in-lieu-of-tax payments on state promise to let counties spend
such payments as they choose); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
17 (1981) (Congress may fix terms on which it disperses federal funds); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968) (Congress permissibly conditioned welfare grants upon state
agreement to pay welfare benefits to child whose mother lives with man to whom she is
not married); Oklahoma v. U. S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947) (cutoff
of federal highway funding to state which did not remove state officials who had violated
Hatch Act).
91. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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actions against states for monetary relief,' Bell v. New Jersey held
that the Tenth Amendment did not bar the federal government from
recovering grant money that states had misused:93
Requiring states to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as
a condition of federal funding before recognizing their ownership of
funds simply does not intrude on their sovereignty. The state chose
to participate in the Title I program and, as a condition of receiving
the grant, freely gave its assurances that it would abide by the
conditions of Title L"
c. In areas reserved for state authority: South Dakota v. Dole
The next major step for conditional spending was South Dakota
v. Dole,95 in which Congress reduced by five percent its grant of
highway funds to any state that did not raise its drinking age to
twenty-one.' Since the Twenty-first Amendment gives states
"virtually complete control" over the sale of liquor, South Dakota
said the condition interfered with one of its core powers.98 The
argument was simple: since Congress could not directly order a state
to raise its drinking age, it could not use the Spending Power to do so
indirectly.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's answer was equally simple: Congress
could indirectly encourage what it could not directly regulate.' He
said that neither the Twenty-first'0° nor the Tenth Amendment limited
Congressionally-imposed conditions.1' After all, a state always has
"'the simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is federal
coercion."'' 2 And there was no coercion here. Rehnquist said that
92. Edelman, 415 U.S.at 663-71; Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 167.
93. 461 U.S. 773, 780-89 (1983). The Court rejected New Jersey's argument that the
federal government, like a private party, could get only injunctive relief. Id. at 780-83.
94. Id. at 790.
95. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
96. 23 U.S.C § 158 (1984).
97. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205 (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980)).
98. Id. at 205.
99. Id. at 206, 212.
100. Id. at 209-10.
101. Id. at 210 (citing Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44
(1947)) (upholding Hatch Act's grant of federal funds conditioned on state officials'
obedience to campaign finance laws).
102. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (quoting Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
127, 143-44 (1947)).
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losing five percent of a state's highway funds was "relatively mild
encouragement" which made the State's claim of coercion "more
rhetoric than fact." 103
Dole displayed little concern about how Congress might abuse
the Conditional Spending power. Justice Rehnquist presented
neither horror stories about past conditions nor dire predictions of
how future conditions might harm the states. This failure to sound
the alarm was not because the Court could not foresee the clash
between the Conditional Spending power and the Eleventh
Amendment. In the decade before Dole, the Court had confronted
this problem in at least five cases. I turn next to that part of the story.
C. The Conditional Spending Power vis-a-vis State Sovereign Immunity
1. The Supreme Court from Edelman to Dole
The Court apparently first confronted the conflict between the
Spending Clause and the Eleventh Amendment in 1974. In Edelman
v. Jordan,°4 aged, blind, and disabled citizens argued that Congress
had conditioned Illinois' participation in a federal entitlement
program upon a waiver of its sovereign immunity to suits by
applicants who believed it had not followed the program's rules."
Justice Marshall agreed in dissent." He described the
relationship between Illinois and the federal government as an
"essentially contractual agreement, 'l1° in which the "lure of federal
funds" had caused the state to agree voluntarily to obey the relevant
federal statutes and regulations."° Marshall said that the federal
government could not ensure state compliance with those federal
rules unless federal courts could issue monetary awards against a
state: if the Eleventh Amendment limited federal courts to
prospective injunctive relief, state officials would have considerable
incentive to save state funds by ignoring those rules until a federal
court enjoined them."° He also argued that by participating in the
federal entitlement program with the knowledge that the relevant
103. Id.
104. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
105. Id. at 415 U.S. at 676 n.18 (quoting brief for respondent at 42-43).
106. Id. at 688-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 693 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Cardozo had reached a similar
conclusion in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 597 (1937).
108. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 693.
109. Id. at 691-92.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
federal statutes permitted suits against states, Illinois had waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity."' On the last page of his dissent,
Marshall invoked a 1959 decision, Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Commission that will resurface again in this Article."' In Petty, the
Court upheld an interstate compact that Congress had approved, but
only on the condition that the two involved states waive their
immunity to lawsuits involving the compact.112  Justice Marshall
pointed out that even the Petty dissenters had agreed Congress could
condition its consent to a federal-state agreement on the state's
waiver of sovereign immunity, just as Congress had done with
Illinois."3
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion avoided the issue, finding
that Illinois' participation in the program was not enough to create a
waiver."4  Nevertheless, Justice Marshall's argument did not go
unnoticed. A year after Edelman, Congress required the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare to withhold ten percent of federal
Medicaid funds from states that did not waive its immunity to suits by
Medicaid participants."5
Meanwhile, the clash between conditional spending and the
Eleventh Amendment continued to appear before the Court. "6
110. Id. at 694. Justice Marshall said that since Illinois was acting outside "a sphere
that is exclusively its own," it was easier to find a waiver. Id. at 695-96. Although he did
not identify it as such, Justice Marshall was using the constructive waiver concept
developed in Parden v. Terminal R. Co. of Ala. Docks Dep't., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), and
decisively buried in College Savings Bank. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 666, 676-86.
111. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 696 (citing Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275
(1959)).
112. 359 U.S. at 279-82.
113. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 696 (citing Petty, 359 U.S. at 285 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
114. Id. at 671-74.
115. Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. 94-182, § 111(a), 89 Stat. 1051, 1054 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(g)). Ten months later, Congress repealed the statute, with little
explanation. Act of Oct. 18, 1976, Pub. L. 94-552, 90 Stat. 2540, 2540, repealing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a (repeal effective Jan. 1, 1976). The repeal's retroactive effective date was the day
after the amendment had been passed.
The House report on the repeal complained that the amendment required states to waive
"one of their basic rights," exposed states to "an unreasonable burden of suits," and failed
to provide states sufficient time to provide the waivers. H.R. No. 94-1122, pt. VI, at 4
(1976). All of those claims should have been obvious before Congress adopted the
original statute.
116. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 880 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (asking if Congress might condition federal grants on compliance with federal
minimum wage standards), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985). See Fla. Dept. of Health v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass'n., 450 U.S. 147, 153
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Rehnquist again avoided this clash in two cases - National League of
Cities v. Usery"7 and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman"'-though he strongly suggested that such conditions were
permissible: "[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. By insisting
that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of
their participation."
119
And since both Employees and Edelman were Eleventh
Amendment cases, Rehnquist may already have concluded that
conditional spending circumnavigates state sovereign immunity.
The Conditional Spending power's relationship to the Eleventh
Amendment returned to the Court in 1985, in Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon.' ° The trial court had ruled for a disabled job
seeker against a state hospital which received federal funds.' The
Court responded by tightening the clear statement rule, making
abrogation more difficult. 2 But again, the clear statement rule was
the only limit the Court seemed to impose, 23 causing one of President
Reagan's assistant attorney generals to say "Atascadero provides the
blueprint for Congressional action to waive the Eleventh
Amendment's ban to suit in Federal court under the Fourteenth
(1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (Congress can "unambiguously condition . . .state
participation in federal programs on a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment defense.").
117. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 (expressing "no view" on use of Spending Power to "affect
integral operations of state governments").
118. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
119. Id. at 17. Justice Rehnquist relegated possible problems to a footnote, saying only
that the conditional spending power has "limits," which he did not identify, and that the
litigants "recognize the 'constitutional difficulties' with imposing affirmative obligations
on the states pursuant to the spending power, (citation omitted). That issue, however, is
not before us." Id. at 17.
120. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
121. Scanlon v. Atascadero, 735 F.2d 359, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit
noted that funds were provided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Id.
at 360.
122. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-243 (Congress may abrogate state immunity only "by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute"). Earlier cases had
said that the Court also would examine the legislative history. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S.
at 673 (requiring "the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from
the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction."); Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979) (statute lacks "a history which focuses directly on the question of
state liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate"
state immunity).
123. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 245-46.
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Amendment and the spending power." '124
In short, in the thirteen years before Dole, the Court had
discussed the Conditional Spending Power in four Eleventh
Amendment cases and another landmark federalism case. This
suggests that Justice Rehnquist was well aware of what his decision in
Dole might mean for state sovereign immunity.
2. The prelude to the Alden trilogy
In the decade after Dole, states won one victory after another
before the Supreme Court.125 Several of those cases involved state
sovereign immunity.126  Many scholars pointed out how pro-states'
rights the Court was and how hostile it was toward various federal
interests.127  However, buried in one of those victories were three
124. 132 CONG. REC. S28624 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (report of John R. Bolton,
Assistant Attorney General). Bolton was speaking of the proposed Civil Rights Remedies
Equalization Act of 1986; he also said that if Congress would remove the bill's retroactive
effect, the Justice Department would have "no objection" to it.
In addition, Senator Cranston told the Senate that Atascadero "clearly established
[that•.. ] Congress has the authority to waive the states' 11th Amendment immunity under
... the commerce clause, the spending clause, and section 5 of the 14th Amendment." 131
CONG. REC. S22346 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1985) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
125. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating §13981 of Violence
Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which made violence against women a
federal crime); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating federal statute
requiring state officials to administer federal gun control laws); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Gun Free Schools Zone Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993) which
limited extent to which states could regulate religious activities); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (state not bound to terms of federal compact which other states
had developed, signed, and obeyed).
126. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59-66, 72 (1996) (overturning
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). In Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe ofIdaho,
Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy went so far as to suggest restrictions on the use of Ex
parte Young's prospective relief concept, 521 U.S. 261, 27-80 (1997) (Kennedy, J.). Ex
parte Young, of course, said that while private citizens could not sue a State directly, they
could sue state officials for injunctive relief. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
See also Wis. Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998) (state which removed
civil rights case from state court still could seek dismissal of the case it had made federal).
127. See, e.g., SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 136-88
(1989) (contending that Chief Justice Rehnquist excessively defers to state regulations
when considering their constitutionality, advocates a highly-relaxed standard of review for
state statutes, construes § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment narrowly, and tries to insulate
States from the federal judiciary); Erwin Chemerinsky, Congress, The Supreme Court, and
the Eleventh Amendment: A Comment on the Decisions During the 1988-89 Term, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 339 (1989) (Supreme Court's Eleventh Amdendment decisions
suggest that Court's conservatives "do all they can" to protect states from federal courts);
Owen Fiss & Charles Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March
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sentences written by a justice who had been concerned that Dole
inadequately protected states.2 1 In New York v. United States, Justice
O'Connor's discussion of federalism, coercion, and the Tenth
Amendment concluded with these lines:
This is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a
State to regulate in a particular way, or that Congress may not
hold out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a
State's policy choices. Our cases have identified a variety of
methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may
urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with
federal interests .... First, under Congress' spending power,
"Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds.'1
29
Justice O'Connor expressly distinguished coercion and conditional
spending, and she listed conditional spending as the first and,
presumably, the most important limitation on State sovereign
immunity. Joining her were Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter, and Thomas, all but one of whom belong to the Court's
conservative wing. Even the advocates of states' rights had admitted
that Conditional Spending could circumnavigate state sovereign
immunity.
3. The Alden Trilogy's dicta
In many ways, the June 23, 1999 decisions in Alden, Florida
Prepaid, and College Savings Bank continued the long string of state
victories in the Supreme Court. " ° But even as the conservative
majority of the Court read state sovereign immunity more
expansively than ever before, it made substantial concessions to the
Conditional Spending power. 3 '
10, 1982, at 20 (alleging that Chief Justice Rehnquist confuses the Constitution with the
Articles of Confederation and ignores Civil War Amendments when discussing fedral-
State relations).
128. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213-17 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992) (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at
206).
130. Alden said that since state sovereign immunity is based on the Tenth Amendment,
a state court could not hear a state employees' suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
even though the text of Eleventh Amendment limits only the federal judicial power. 527
U.S. at 706. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. said that federal patent holder
could not seek money damages from a state's allegedly deliberate infringement of that
patent. 527 U.S. 627. College Savings Bank held that the same federal patent holder could
not invoke federal protections against a state's false and misleading advertising. 527 U.S.
666.
131. In Alden, the Court said for the first time that state sovereign immunity was based
on the Tenth Amendment. 527 U.S. at 713. See also Alden, at 760-61 (Souter, J.,
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a. Justice Kennedy in Alden
One can hardly claim that, in 1999, Justice Kennedy suddenly
became soft on federalism. In May of that year, he warned that the
Spending Power might "obliterate" the distinction between national
and local governments.132 A month later, in Alden, he announced that
while the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against states only in
federal court, state sovereign immunity meant that a state court did
not have to hear a federal civil rights claim against the state.133 He
based this decision on the revelation that state sovereign immunity is
based on the Tenth Amendment,"M a position that even states' rights
supporters had not taken three years earlier in Seminole Tribe. 1
5
Yet, even as he expanded State sovereign immunity, Justice
Kennedy seemed comfortable with Congressional use of conditional
spending to encourage states to waive their immunity. Indeed, that
tactic was the second item on his list of limitations on State immunity:
Rather, certain limits are implicit in the constitutional principle
of sovereign immunity.
The first of these limits is that sovereign immunity bars suits
only in the absence of consent. Many States, on their own
initiative, have enacted statutes consenting to a wide variety of
suits. The rigors of sovereign immunity are thus "mitigated by a
sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the
suability of the sovereign." Nor, subject to constitutional
limitations, does the Federal Government lack the authority or
means to seek the States' voluntary consent to private suits.
Attached to Justice Kennedy's signature on Alden were those of four
colleagues: Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, who
also had endorsed O'Connor's near-identical statements about
conditional spending in New York v. United States.137  Justice
Marshall's 1974 dissent had become 1999 majority dicta. The issue
dissenting) (attacking Court's use of the Tenth Amendment).
132. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennedy has said that Conditional Spending now is the major states'
rights issue facing the Court. Lynn A. Baker, The Revival of States' Rights: A Progress
Report and a Proposal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 95, 103 n.49 (1998).
133. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
134. Id. at 713-14. But see Alden, at 760-61 (Souter, J., dissenting) (attacking Court's
use of the Tenth Amendment).
135. Id. at 761 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Alden's Tenth Amendment
argument would have made it unnecessary for Seminole Tribe to discuss the Eleventh
Amendment).
136. Id. at 755. (citations omitted) Seminole Tribe's list did not include the Spending
Power. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14.
137. Alden, 527 U.S. at 710.
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the Court had so carefully avoided in earlier Eleventh Amendment
cases had been resolved in what was essentially a laundry list. But
more was to come.
b. Justice Scalia and College Savings Bank
In College Savings Bank, Justice Scalia continued to advance the
cause of State sovereign immunity.'38 However, even as he did so, he
went out of his way to justify the use of the Conditional Spending
power as a counterweight to state sovereign immunity.
College Savings Bank's dispute over a state's allegedly willful
violation of a privately-held trademark did not involve conditional
spending.'39 But it did offer Justice Scalia an easy way to eliminate
that Article I power. Since the case involved Congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause, it turned in part on the breadth of
Seminole Tribe's holding. That decision had begun narrowly by
asking if the Indian Commerce Clause let Congress abrogate state
sovereign immunity,4 ' but it had ended broadly by saying that
"Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction.' 4' Had Seminole Tribe used
"Article I" merely as shorthand for the Indian and Domestic
Commerce Clauses? Did "Article I" include all of Article I's
enumerated clauses? 142 Or did it include all of Article I, including the
general spending power? Some lower federal courts already had
adopted the latter interpretation,143 which would prevent the use of
138. See id. at 687-88 (accusing Justice Breyer of repeating, "the now-fashionable
revisionist accounts of the Eleventh Amendment set forth in other opinions in a degree of
repetitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods.").
139. Id. at 668-71. At issue was the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567, amending Section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946, 60
Stat. 441, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
140. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
141. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
142. Alden had adopted this approach, 527 U.S. at 733 ("[N]either the Supremacy
Clause nor the enumerated powers of Congress confer authority to abrogate the States'
immunity .... ), as would a later case, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364, (2001) ("Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I.").
143. See, e.g., Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38, 39 n.2 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Congress
cannot abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity pursuant to any
Article I power"), cert. denied sub nom. Schlossburg v. Md. Comptroller of Treasury, 523
U.S. 1075 (1998); In re Creative Goldsmiths of D.C., 119 F.3d 1140, 1145 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Seminole Tribe "extended to restrict all federal jurisdiction over the states based on
Article I powers..."); New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d
1240, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (Congress cannot abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
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conditional spending regarding state immunity. Which approach
would Justice Scalia take?
And what of "circumvent"? Seminole Tribe had used "abrogate"
or its derivatives at least forty-six times."' Why did the last page use
"circumvent," a broader verb? Had Justice Rehnquist, who wrote
Seminole Tribe, remembered his references to conditional spending in
Edelman, Usery, and Pennhurst? To eliminate the Conditional
Spending Power's threat to state sovereign immunity, Justice Scalia in
College Savings Bank merely had to quote Seminole Tribe's last-page
statement that Congress could not use its "Article I powers" to
"circumvent" the Eleventh Amendment.
He did not. Instead, this supporter of State sovereign immunity
limited Seminole Tribe to both Commerce Clauses (instead of all of
Article I) and to "abrogation," instead of the broader concept of
145circumvention.14
Justice Scalia then passed up a second chance to protect state
immunity from conditional spending. College Savings Bank and the
United States had argued that Florida had constructively waived its
immunity, even though the Court had started to erode that doctrine
almost immediately after its birth in Parden v. Terminal Ry. County
of Alabama Docks Department'46 This was Justice Scalia's chance to
kill the doctrine of constructive waiver once and for all, and he did.47
But for reasons that remain obscure, the United States gave Justice
Scalia a second shot at conditional spending by labeling it a form of
constructive waiver.'18 Having watched the Court drive nail after nail
into the constructive waiver coffin, the federal government gave
Justice Scalia the chance to permanently bury it.
Justice Scalia did more than decline the opportunity. He found
in the structure of the Constitution justification for the authority of
"pursuant to its powers under Article I of the Constitution."); In re C.J. Rogers, 212 B.R.
265, 273 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (after Seminole Tribe, "under any Article I power Congress
can neither abrogate, nor deem to be waived, the states' sovereign immunity").
144. See 517 U.S. at 47, 52, 53, 55 (5), 56 (5), 57 (2), 58 (4), 59 (6), 60 (4), 61 (4), 62 (3),
63 (2), 65 (1), 66 (1), 68, 70 n.13, 71 (4). "Circumvent" appears only on page 73 of Justice
Rehnquist's opinion. Id. at 73.
145. 527 U.S. at 672. Justice Scalia used "abrogation" and its variations nineteen times
in College Savings Bank. 527 U.S. at 667, 671 (3 times), 672 (3 times), 675, 678, 683 (3
times), 684 (4 times), 687 n.5, 688 n.5, and 691. He used "circumvent" only once, in
connection with constructive waiver. Id. at 683.
146. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 676 (invoking Parden, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See id. at
680 (court has consistently narrowed Parden's rule)).
147. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680.
148. See id. at 686.
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Congress to use conditional spending to override state immunity.
Having said that Congress could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity using the Commerce Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment,
or constructive waiver, Justice Scalia wrote:
And we have held in such cases as South Dakota v. Dole, that
Congress may, in the exercise of its spending power, condition
its grant of funds to the States upon their taking certain actions
that Congress could not require them to take, and that
acceptance of the funds entails an agreement to the actions.
These cases seem to us fundamentally different from the present
149
one.
In other words, College Savings Bank gave Justice Scalia the
opportunity to lump conditional spending with Congressional efforts
to abrogate immunity (which Seminole Tribe had invalidated) or with
constructive waivers (which he had just buried). Instead, he
intentionally distinguished them. Then he went further:
Under the Compact Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3,
States cannot form an interstate compact without first obtaining
the express consent of Congress; the granting of such consent is
a gratuity. So also, Congress has no obligation to use its
Spending Clause power to disburse funds to the States; such
funds are gifts. In the present case, however, what Congress
threatens if the State refuses to agree to its condition is not the
denial of a gift or gratuity, but a sanction: exclusion of the State
from otherwise permissible activity. Justice Breyer's dissent
acknowledges the intuitive difference between the two, but
asserts that it disappears when the gift that is threatened to be
withheld is substantial enough. Post, at 697. Perhaps so, which
is why, in cases involving conditions attached to federal funding,
we have acknowledged that 'the financial inducement offered
by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
'pressure turns into compulsion.. '" 50
It is unclear where Justice Scalia found this distinction between
Article I clauses that sanction and Article I clauses that give. I am
relatively confident that he did not create it out of sympathy for state
immunity opponents. 5' But in coupling the Spending Power with the
Interstate Compact Power,152 instead of with the enumerated Article I
149. Id. at 686 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
150. Id. at 687.
151. Only a paragraph later, Justice Scalia accused state immunity opponents of
creating "now-fashionable revisionist accounts of the Eleventh Amendment set forth
in... a degree of repetitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods." Id. at 688.
152. See Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (explaining that,
under the Interstate Compact Clause, Congress can condition approval of interstate
compact upon immunity waivers by participating states).
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powers (which Seminole Tribe said cannot override state immunity),
Justice Scalia recognized that Justice Marshall had been correct back
in 1974. And attached to Justice Scalia's signature were those of
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas. The Court's
five most conservative members, its five strongest defenders of states'
rights, recognized that conditional spending could override state
sovereign immunity. Together with the four remaining justices, who,
in a College Savings Bank dissent, also said conditional spending
could override state immunity,153 the Court was unanimous. When it
came to sovereign immunity, money would talk.
4. The lower federal courts and conditional spending
The lower federal courts have proved remarkably willing to let
Congress use conditional spending to override state sovereign
immunity. As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has written,
"[tihus we hold that states must take the bitter with the sweet; having
accepted the money, they must litigate in federal court., 154 At least
sixteen courts (including all thirteen circuit courts) have upheld
federal grants conditioned upon state waivers of immunity to suits
involving the funded programs. These decisions concerned:
1.The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 55
2.The Federal Aid Highways Act of 1968,156
3. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,'57
4. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, 58
153. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied sub nom. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 531 U.S. 824 (2000).
155. 20 U.S.C. § 1401-91 (1976); see Dep't of Educ. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 818-
19 (9th Cir. 1983) (state waived sovereign immunity under Act).
156. 23 U.S.C. § 101-06 (1988 & Supp. 111990); see Hatmaker v. Ga. Dep't of Transp.,
973 F. Supp. 1047, 1053-54 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (highway department waived immunity when
it received funds).
157. 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1491o (1997). See Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d
931, 935 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, sub nom. Bd. of Education of Oak Park v. Ill. State Bd. of
Educ., 531 U.S. 824 (2000) ("States that accept federal money, as Illinois has done, must
respect the terms and conditions of the grant."); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183
F.3d 816, 820, 831-32 (8th Cir. 1999) (participating states in IDEA waive sovereign
immunity), abrogated by Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 752-53 (8th Cir.
1999), overruled by Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert.
denied, 533 U.S. 949, 121 S. Ct. 2591 (2001).
158. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (replacing Aid to Families with
Dependent Children with federal block grants to states). See Kansas v. United States, 214
F.3d 1196, 1198-1204 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000).
[Vol. 29:3
Spring 2002] WAIVERS OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 469
5. The Randolph-Sheppard Act, 59
6. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,'60
7. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986,161
8. The federal student loan program,
9. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 163 and
10. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972.'64
Another fifteen courts have avoided the issue by finding that
particular statutes did not require a waiver,16 ' although seven of them
159. 20 U.S.C. §§ 107-107f (2000). Under this act, the federal government agrees to
provide equipment if states will give blind people first preference as operators of vending
stores in state-owned facilities. Two circuit courts have said the act effectively conditions
this federal aid on a state's waiver of immunity to suits involving the blind vendors. See
Premo v. Martin, 119 F.3d 764, 769-71 (9th Cir. 1997); Del. Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv. v.
U.S. Dep't of Educ., 772 F.2d 1123,1126-33, 1137-38 (3d Cir. 1985).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 793; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (2000) (stating the waiver provision);
see Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 533 U.S.
949, 121 S. Ct. 2591 (2001); Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000); Clark v.
California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1269-71 (9th Cir. 1997) (Rehabilitation Act abrogates state
sovereign immunity); Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1134 (D. Kan. 2000).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000); see Robinson, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 1131-34.
162. See, e.g., Perkins Loan Program, 34 C.F.R. § 674.1-674.63 (2002). See In re Innes,
184 F.3d 1275, 1281-83 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Innes v. Kan. State Univ.,
529 U.S. 1037 (2000).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-4 (2000); see Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 493-94
(11th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 836 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (university regents
conceded it consented to action for monetary relief in federal court when it accepted Title
VI funds), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir.
1999).
164. 20 U.S.C. § 1681-88 and its waiver provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-7(a)(1) (2000). See
Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 875-76 (5th Cir. 2000); Litman v. George
Mason, 186 F.3d 544, 547, 550-56 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000);
Beasley v. Ala. State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1308-22 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
165. McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (Congress may use Spending
Power to extract waiver, but no evidence defendants receive federal funding);
Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Serv., 225 F.3d 1208,
1226 n.13 (11th Cir. 2000) (while state may waive sovereign immunity by accepting federal
funds, Medicaid Act lacks clear statement of Congressional intent to condition funds on
waiver); Bradley v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 189 F.3d 745, 757-58 (8th Cir. 1999) (Section 504,
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)), overruled, Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079
(8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001); Tenn. Dep't of Human Serv. v.
U.S. Dep't of Educ., 979 F.2d 1162, 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1992) (Randolph-Shepard Act
does not mention availability of citizen suits against state); Yorktown Med. Lab., Inc. v.
Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (repeal of amendments expressly conditioning
Medicaid funds on waiver showed Congress intended not to require state waiver);
McNabb v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 862 F.2d 681, 685-687 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
(Randolph-Shepard Act could have, but did not, condition receipt of funds on sovereign
immunity waiver); Hosp. Ass'n of N.Y., Inc. v. Toia, 577 F.2d 790, 793-96 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Medicaid Act did not create waiver of immunity); New Holland Viii. Condo. v. DeStaso
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expressly said they would uphold a properly-worded statute.66 Other
courts declined to determine if a particular statute created an
effective waiver.
1 67
I found only one naysayer, a Second Circuit panel that
overlooked crucial parts of College State Bank."8
Enter. Ltd., 139 F. Supp. 2d 499, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (state use of federal funds under
National Dam Safety Act, 33 U.S.C. § 467 (1996), did not waive immunity, since statute
did not mention immunity); Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558-61
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (although Congress can influence states via spending clause programs,
and states are bound if they agree to participate in federal program, plaintiffs cannot use
Ex parte Young to require states to provide services, since Spending Clause programs are
not the "supreme law of the land"); Appalachian Outdoor Adver. Co. v. N.C. Dep't of
Transp., 61 F. Supp. 2d 459, 461 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (state's "mere participation" in federal
program under Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4601, did not show waiver of immunity); Heckman v. Univ. of
N.C., 19 F. Supp. 2d 468, 469, 474 (M.D. N.C. 1998), appeal dismissed, 166 F.3d 1209 (4th
Cir. 1998) (state's contract with federal government under Vietnam Era Veterans'
Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4100 and 4212 (2000), did not waive state's
sovereign immunity); Kinnison v. Miss. Dep't of Wildlife, 990 F. Supp. 481, 484 (S.D. Miss.
1998) (plaintiff failed to allege statute conditioned federal wildlife funds on waiver);
Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1169 (S.D. Ohio 1997)
(Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791-94, does not condition receipt of federal funds
on immunity waiver); Taylor v. Virginia, 951 F. Supp. 591, 603 (E.D. Va. 1996) (Fair Labor
Standards Act not spending program; neither Federal Highway Act nor Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 show Congressional intent to condition
funds on waivers); Selman v. Harvard Med. Sch., 494 F. Supp. 603, 616 (S.D.N.Y 1980),
affd without opinion sub nom. Burton Selman v. Harvard Med. Sch., 494 F.2d 1204 (2d
Cir. 1980) (although Congress may condition program participation on waiver of
immunity, Public Health Services Act did not include such condition and mere receipt of
federal funds does not create waiver).
166. McGinty, 251 F.3d at 95; Fla. Ass'n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc., 225 F.3d at 1226 n.13;
Ass'n of Cmt. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1389, 1389 n.2 (5th Cir.
1996); In re Sec'y of Dep't of Crime Control, 7 F.3d 1140, 1145-47 (4th Cir. 1993);
McNabb, 862 F.2d at 685-687; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. West Va. Dep't of Highways,
845 F.2d 468, 470 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 855 (1988) (although federal statute
may condition funds on immunity waiver, plaintiff presented only state statutes); Nihiser
v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 979 F. Supp. 1168, 1169 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (Congress can
require state to waive immunity before receiving funds).
167. Kilcullen v. N.Y. State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (Section 504
of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Unclear if legislative history and caption of 20.U.S.C. § 1403 (2000), I.D.E.A. provided
state sufficient notice to establish waiver).
168. Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56, 59 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1052 (2000). The Second Circuit read College Savings Bank to say that Congress can
abrogate state immunity only under the Fourteenth Amendment. That is true, but the
Conditional Spending Power involves a waiver, not abrogation. Moreover, College
Savings Bank explicitly cited Dole for the point that "Congress may, in the exercise of its
spending power, condition its grant of funds to states upon their taking certain actions that
Congress could not require them to take." 527 U.S. at 686-87. Alden v. Maine also
endorsed such use of conditional spending, saying Congress may "seek the states'
voluntary consent to private suits. Cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)." 527
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In short, all nine Supreme Court justices and sixteen lower courts
have said that conditional spending can trump state sovereign
immunity. But what limits has the Court imposed on that power?
D. The Limits of Conditional Spending
1. The Four Dole tests
The Conditional Spending Power must have limits,169 but the
Court has long said that Article I, Section 8's enumerated powers do
not provide such a limit.17° Instead, South Dakota v. Dole identified
(and numbered) four tests. To be valid, a condition must:
(1) involve spending for the "general welfare";171
(2) unambiguously appear in the relevant statute; '
(3) sufficiently relate to "the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs";73 and
(4) not violate an independent constitutional bar.'
The first test poses little danger to conditional spending, since
the Court traditionally has deferred to Congress' definition of the
U.S. 706, 755 (1999). Burnette referred to neither of those points.
The Second Circuit probably was not helped by the pro se plaintiff homeowners, who
invoked the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9601 et. seq. (1982), as amended by Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). Pennsylvania. v.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989) had held these statutes abrogated the Eleventh Amendment,
but by the time the plaintiffs filed suit, Seminole Tribe had struck down Union Gas.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 62-66.
169. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J.) (Unlimited Spending Power would let
Congress invade states' jurisdiction); Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-
55 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) (Unrestrained Spending Power might "obliterate" distinctions
between national and local governments); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending
After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1914, 1932-33 (1995) (without limits, the Spending
Clause would let Congress evade Constitutional restrictions on its power); Albert J.
Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103,
1105-06 (1987) (unlimited conditional spending could destroy balance between federal and
state governments). But see RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 150, 157
(arguing that modern interpretations of the taxing and spending power leave no limits on
those powers).
170. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 175-76 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173 (1991); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 270 (1990); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936).
171. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 208 (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
174. 483 U.S. at 208.
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general welfare.175  The second requirement - an unambiguous
statement - is likewise easy for the drafter to satisfy. She need only
include the "Eleventh Amendment" or "state sovereign immunity" in
the text of the statute.176
The third, "sufficient relation" test has at least two meanings.
Justice Rehnquist read it loosely when he found that encouraging a
state to raise its drinking age "directly relate[s]" to the legitimate goal
of making interstate travel safer, the main purpose of federal highway
funding.177 Justice O'Connor, however, would have invalidated the
condition because it went "beyond specifying how the money should
be spent."'78  Use of the Conditional Spending power to induce
sovereign immunity waivers should satisfy even Justice O'Connor's
tighter approach. In asking states to waive their immunity, Congress
seeks state consent to private suits designed to enforce the rules and
regulations of a particular spending program. These private suits help
Congress make sure that states spend the money as Congress has
directed.179
175. Id. at 207; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 645 (1937). The lower federal
courts have said little about this.
176. A federal statute is sufficiently unambiguous when it says a state "shall not be
immune under the Eleventh Amendment;" it need not mention "waiver." Litman v.
George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 547, 554 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181
(2000).
I found only four published cases that used this test to strike down conditional spending.
Two involved conditions imposed by an administrative agency (not Congress) after the
state had signed onto the program. Doe v. Oak Park & River Forest High Sch., 115 F.3d
1273, 1278 (7th Cir. 1997); Va. Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561, 566-67 (4th Cir.
1997).
Two other cases involved the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 107-
107f (2000), which requires states to arbitrate disputes with blind vendors who operate
snack bars in government buildings. The Act does not mention sovereign immunity, the
Eleventh Amendment, or the availability of monetary relief. Tenn. Dep't of Human Serv.
v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 979 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1992); McNabb v. U.S. Dep't of
Educ., 862 F.2d 681, 686, 687 (8th Cir. 1988) (Fagg, J. and Doty, J., concurring and
dissenting); but see Del. Dep't of Health & Soc. Serv. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 772 F.2d
1123, 1128, 1138 (3d Cir. 1985) (upholding constitutionality of the Act).
177. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208,209.
178. Id. at 215-16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
179. The lower federal courts have said little about this relevancy or germaneness
requirement. One court has said that the waiver could apply only to those state
departments that received federal funds under the particular spending program. Jim C.,
235 F.3d at 1081. Several courts have approved conditions which were intended to
increase state compliance with federal law. A pre-Dole case, Oklahoma v. Schweiker,
upheld conditions that required states to "pass-through" to welfare recipients cost of living
increases granted by Congress, saying "[g]uaranteeing the proper use of federal funds is
certainly an appropriate congressional concern .... 655 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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The fourth of Dole's tests should give surprisingly little difficulty.
The condition must not violate "an independent constitutional bar,"
which Justice Rehnquist explained "stands for the unexceptionable
proposition that the power may not be used to induce the States to
engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional":
Congress may not require a state to discriminate or inflict cruel and
unusual punishment.'" Conditional spending tied to waivers of state
immunity would face little objection on these grounds. The sole
purpose of such conditions would be to encourage states to follow -
not to violate - federal law that they (the states) already had agreed
to follow when they signed on to the relevant federal program. And
since Justice Rehnquist did not use the Twenty-First Amendment,
which assigns authority over liquor to the states, to satisfy the
"independent constitutional bar" test, we know that this fourth test
does not prevent Congress from imposing conditions in areas
reserved to state control. 8'
2. Coercion
a. The problem
The Dole Four tests are relatively easy to satisfy. But in the most
puzzling part of the opinion, Dole also talked about "coercion."
Having identified, numbered, and applied four tests, Justice
Rehnquist next said "Our decisions have recognized that in some
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be
so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into
compulsion.' Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, supra, 301 U.S., at 590.
''
182
That passage created several problems. It did not explain
coercion's relationship to the four tests earlier identified and
numbered. Indeed, the opinion's structure and language suggested
that "coercion" might be simply a synonym for Dole's four numbered
More recently, two trial courts upheld a federal welfare program that required states to
operate systems that trace the out-of-state movements of parents who failed to pay child
support. Both courts said that the goals of federal welfare programs had been hindered by
local enforcement systems that could not track delinquent parents who moved out of state,
so the conditions were rationally related to the purpose of the federal statute. Hodges v.
Shalala, 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 874 (D.S.C. 2000); Children's & Parents' Rights Ass'n v.
Sullivan, 787 F. Supp. 724, 735 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (noting that such conditions on child
support were much more closely related to the purpose of the federal funding involved
than was the condition in Dole).
180. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11.
181. Id. at 211.
182. Id.
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tests or a part of the fourth and final of those tests (the independent
constitutional bar).'83 It did not define "coercion."'" And, assuming
that "coercion" is a standard independent of Dole's four enumerated
tests, it does not say whether we should read the word in terms of
constitutional law or contract law. Dole's discussion of coercion rests
on a single case -Steward Machine Co. v. Davis-and Steward
Machine analyzed coercion from both constitutional 5 and contractual
perspectives.186  Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist himself has
recognized that conditional spending is a form of contract,'87 as has
the rest of the Court'
183. Justice Rehnquist carefully numbered the Dole Four tests, 483 U.S. at 207-08, and
later repeated those numbers. Id. at 208-11. But he did not assign a number to coercion.
Id. at 211-12. In addition, after saying that the spending power is "subject to several
general restrictions," Justice Rehnquist listed the Dole Four tests in a single paragraph,
without referring to "coercion." 483 U.S. at 207. Similarly, in New York v. United States,
Justice O'Connor's discussion of conditional spending asked if Congress had "exceeded its
authority in any of the four respects our cases have identified," cited Dole, and listed
Dole's four factors. 505 U.S. 144, 171-72 (1992). Third, Justice Rehnquist began his
discussion of Dole's fourth test (the "independent constitutional bar") by writing: "The
remaining question... is whether the Twenty-first Amendment constitutes an
'independent constitutional bar' to the conditional grant of federal funds." 483 U.S. at 209
[emphasis added]. His use of the singular "question" leaves no room for an additional
fifth test. Fourth, Dole gave no clue as to where the independent constitutional bar test
ends and coercion begins. No transition sentence or phrase indicated the end of the
"independent constitutional bar" test in particular or the Dole Four tests in general, nor
was there a clue Justice Rehnquist had started to discuss a new, independent test. See id.
at 211.
184. Id. at 210-12.
185. See, e.g., 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) (Tenth Amendment); id. at 585 ("restrictions
implicit in our federal form of government"); id. at 586 ( "the autonomy of the states"); id.
at 593 ("surrender by the states of powers essential to their quasi sovereign existence.");
id. at 598 ("limitations express or implied of our Federal Constitution").
186. After using contract terms such as "duress" three times, id. at 586, 589, 590, and
"undue influence" twice, id. at 590, Steward Machine determined that a state's right to
withdraw from the conditional spending program at issue at any time meant that no
contract existed. Id. at 596-97. The decision then speaks of "contract" (three times),
"assent," "agreement" (twice), and "just and fair requital for benefits received." Id. at
597-98. This use of contract was not accidental: Steward Machine's author was Benjamin
Cardozo, one of the twentieth-century's leading contract experts. See GRANT GILMORE,
DEATH OF CONTRACT 109-10 (1974) (describing the RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS as a
debate between Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and Justice Cardozo); Arthur Corbin, Mr.
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 56, 52 HARV. L. REV. 426,
48 YALE L.J. 426 (1939).
187. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Sch. Bd. of
Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,290 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion).
188. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (O'Connor, J.);
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 349 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining why
federal-state spending programs are similar to contracts with third-party beneficiaries);
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So what do constitutional law and contract law tell us about
"coercion," the key term that Dole used but did not define?
b. Coercion as a constitutional concept
If Dole's coercion test is constitutional, what does it mean? For a
quarter-century, Justice Rehnquist and his conservative colleagues
have argued that Constitution law must be based on the original
intent of its framers.'89 That has been particularly true in the area of
state sovereign immunity, where the Court expressly has used its
perception of the Founders' views on state immunity to go beyond
Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (White, J., plurality
opinion, joined as to that part of the opinion only by Rehnquist, J.) (describing Title VI as
a "typical contractual spending power provision."). Justice Rehnquist and other members
of the Court also have used the phrase "quid pro quo" to describe federal conditional
spending programs. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau Co., Fla., 480 U.S. at 290 (citing U.S.
Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 605 (1986) (quoting Consol.
Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624,633 n.13 (1984)).
189. Paul Finkelman, Intentionalism, The Founders, and Constitutional Interpretation,
75 TEX. L. REV. 435, 449 (1996) (book review) (identifying Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas as "most prominent devotees" of Original Intent); William H. Rehnquist, The
Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 (1976) (impermissible to
substitute "some other set of values for those which may be derived from the language and
intent of the framers."); Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.;
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 156 (1971), 18-19,
55, 81-82, 138, 167-69 (original intent of Framers is gauge for measuring fidelity to
Constitution) (quoted in Russell M. Mortyn, The Rehnquist Court and the Establishment
Clause, 19 HAST. CON. L.Q. 567, 567 (1992)); see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-107,
107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (using Framers' discussion of religion to interpret
First Amendment; describing "greatest injury" of Jefferson's wall of separation phrase as
"its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of
Rights.").
See also Henry Jaffa, Slaying the Dragon of Bad Originalism: Jaffa Answers Cooper, 1995
PUB. L. REV. 209 (unpaginated) (1995) (Justice Rehnquist as "philosopher-king of the
legal positivist version of original intent jurisprudence); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1366 (1982)
(Justice Rehnquist's version of original intent based on views of Constitution's opponents,
the Anti-Federalists); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV.
849, 856-57 (judge must "immerse" self in "political and intellectual atmosphere of the
time."); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (Scalia, J.) (primary method of
interpreting Fourth Amendment's "search and seizure" clause is "the common law when
the Amendment was framed."); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common
Law, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1739, 1769 (2001), (citing Wyoming, 526 U.S. at 299);
Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966-85, 985
(1991) (Scalia, J.) (using nineteen page discussion of original meaning of Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause to interpret Eighth Amendment; "enough" that
Constitution's framers chose not to include guarantee against disproportionate
sentencing); David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's
Fidelity to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1392-95 (1999)
(explaining Scalia's "Original Meaning" approach).
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the text of the Eleventh Amendment. 190 Although that approach has
bedeviled those concerned with state abuses of power, I now embrace
it. Indeed, I welcome it.
Why? To the Founders of 1787, coercion's meaning was
significantly narrower than a modern lawyer would suspect, and it
does not come close to including the economic pressure involved in
conditional spending.
The brutal fact is that to the Founders, "coercion" meant force,
real force. In 1765, Blackstone defined it in terms of the authority a
husband then had over his wife and the authority of the judiciary.'
One could say that in 1774, "coercion" became almost a term of art to
the Founders. Between March and June 1774, Parliament adopted
the Coercive Acts in response to the Boston Tea Party." The Acts
closed the port of Boston until the colony paid for the destroyed tea,
made the governor directly subject to the Crown, gave him the power
to appoint the colony's council and all her judges, authorized him to
transfer any Massachusetts case to England for trial, and permitted
190. The keystone of the Court's immunity jurisprudence explicitly said it was based
not on the text of the Eleventh Amendment, id. at 10-11, but on the intent of the
Constitution's Framers and their reaction to Chisholm v. South Carolina, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
419 (1793); Hans, 134 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1890).
Today, the Court's conservative members use this argument even as they admit it extends
state immunity beyond the Eleventh Amendment's text. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 733-35
(Kennedy, J.) (rejecting "blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment";
describing Framers' opinions on sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at
54, 69-71 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment's power not limited to
its text, endorsing Hans because it had "a much closer vantage point" to Framers than do
its modern opponents, and discussing intent of Framers); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491
U.S. 1, 31-34 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (Eleventh Amendment
interpretation based on "original understanding against which the Constitution was
adopted").
191. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *442 (1765) (Univ.
of Chi. fascimile ed.) (coercion of wife by husband); IV BLACKSTONE at 64 ("feeble
coercion" of a spiritual court) (1769).
192. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
205, 207-210 (4th prtg. 1965); Rebeccas K. Starr, Political Mobilization, 1775-1776, THE
BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 236 (Jack P. Greene &
J.R. Pole, eds.) (1991); David L. Ammerman, The Tea Crisis and Its Consequences,
through 1775, DOCUMENTS 202-03, 220; Robert M. Calhoon, Loyalism and Neutrality,
DOCUMENTS 248; DIRK HOERDER, CROWD ACTION REVOLUTIONARY
MASSACHUSETI'S 1765-1780, 276-77, 280 (1977). They also were known as the Intolerable
Acts. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 71 (Henry Steele Commager, ed.)
(Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 1948); Ammerman, supra at 201; Colin Bonwick,
Opposition in Britain, DOCUMENTS 242; ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS
CAUSE 230, 262-63 (1982); HOERDER, supra at 271-93.
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British troops to live and eat in private homes.9 Parliament sent a
squadron of the Royal Navy and five regiments to Boston. 94 Lt.
General Thomas Gage was named governor and captain-general of
the colony, and on September 1st, he launched the first of several
military expeditions that would lead to Lexington and Concord."'5
While the American Revolution made the Coercion Acts moot,
"coercion" continued to be recognized as military force or as the
force needed to enforce judicial orders. The Federalist Papers
discussed "coercion" only in terms of military force or the force
exercised by the judiciary, which was but one step from force of
arms.196  Alexander Hamilton told New York's constitutional
convention in 1787 that because states would refuse to be
"instrument[s] of coercion" against other states, the federal
government would have to maintain a standing army that it could use
against states."9 The early Supreme Court echoed his sentiment!
193. See The Boston Port Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c.19 (Eng.) (quoted in DOCUMENT OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 192, at 71); the Massachusetts Government Act, 1774,14
Geo. 3, c.45 (Eng.), quoted in DOCUMENT OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 192, at 72;
Administration of Justice Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c.39 (Eng.) quoted in DOCUMENT OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 192, at 77; the Quartering Act, 1775, 15 Geo. 3, c.15
(Eng.).
Morrison includes the New England Restraining Act, 1775, 15 Geo. 3, c.10 (Eng.), which
barred the New England colonies from trading with any nation other than the United
Kingdom and prohibited New England fisherman from the Newfoundland and Nova
Scotia fisheries. MORISON, supra note 192, at 210.
194. MORISON, supra note 192, at 206.
195. DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, PAUL REVERE'S RIDE 44 (1994).
196. See THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 145 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton
ed., 1904) ("the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms.")
[capitalization in the original]; id., No. 16, at 149-50 (Hamilton) (nation lacks resources to
maintain army large enough to "confine the larger States"; states will dismiss federal plans
"to be executed by a coercion applicable to them" in their collective capacities"); id. ("the
principle of legislation for sovereign states supported by military coercion has never been
found effectual."); id. (efforts to coerce the disobedient have started "bloody wars"
between members of confederacy"); THE FEDERALIST NO. 18, at 158-59 (Alexander
Hamilton & James Madison) (noting Greek Amphictyonic council could "employ the
whole force of the Confederacy against the disobedient," and "declared authority to use
coercion against refractory cities..."); id., No. 19, at 168 ("this scheme of military
coercion"); id., NO. 20, at 177 ("by substituting violence in place of the mild and salutary
coercion of the military.") (all emphasis in the original).
The Oxford English Dictionary similarly implicates force and arms. III OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 435 (2d ed. 1989) ("application of force to control the action of a
voluntary agent"; "compulcion, cohercion, and imprisonment," 1495, Act II, VII, c. 36
preamble; "By strong coercion of our arms subdued," (citing COWPER, THE ILIAD xx.185
(1791)); "forceable restraint" and "government by force" (citing the English Coercion
Acts; and "physical pressure, compulsion.").
197. 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 233 (2d ed. 1863),
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(quoted in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-67 (1992)).
Madison also contemplated that the federal government might use force against the states.
In 1781, state refusals to fulfill requisitions under the Articles of Confederacy prompted a
Congressional committee to recommend use of the Continental army and navy. Madison
was a member of that committee, and wrote Jefferson that "[tihe situation of most of the
states is such that two or three vessels of force employed against their trade will make it
their interest to yield prompt obedience to all just requisitions on them." JACK N.
RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 23
(Harper Collins, 1990), citing 5 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 473-474 (Boyd ed.,
1951).
198. The Supreme Court used "coercion" or its derivatives eleven times between 1791
and 1820. Eight of those uses concerned the authority of courts to enforce their orders.
See Bank of Colum. v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 243 (1819) (debtor's voluntary
bankruptcy submits him to "personal coercion" by court); Williams v. Peyton's Lessee, 17
U.S. 77, 81 n.a (1819) (public officials should let landlord voluntarily pay tax, before
resorting to "coercive means."); Parker v. Rule's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 64, 70 (1815)
(Marshall, C.J.) (legislature wanted to "avoid coercive means of" collecting taxes); The
Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 283 (1814) (Peace treaty that permits subjects of warring
countries to remove or remain in enemy country "does not coerce those subjects either to
remove or remain."); Taylor v. Brown, 9 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1814) (Marshall, C.J.) (while
statute directs surveyor to record every survey he makes, it does not permit landowner to
coerce surveyor into recording survey); United States v. Gurney, 8 U.S. (3 Cranch) 333,
345 (1808) (Marshall, C.J.) ("stipulated damages, of which the law will coerce the
payment...."); United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73, 85 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.)
(voluntary deed is document, signed by bankrupt debtor, "made without coercion of law,"
to give preference to some creditors); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 452 (1793)
(Blair, J.) ("Is it altogether a vain expectation, that a state may have other motives than
such as arise from the apprehension of coercion, to carry into execution a judgment of the
Supreme Court of the United States... ?").
On four other cases, the Court used "coercion" in conjunction with force of arms. See The
Rugen, 14 U.S. 62, 72-73 (1816) (merchant ship who obeyed British brig of war, even
though brig did not put crew aboard or escort merchant ship, did not enter British port
under coercion); The Brig Short Staple v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 55, 56, 60
(1815) (Marshall, C.J.) (ship captured by British armed vessel, boarded by British prize-
master, and abandoned by that vessel in sight of British ship of war was "under the
coercion of a force she was unable to resist."); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
171, 178 (1796) (Paterson, J.) (under Articles of Confederation, "Congress could not...
raise money by taxes .... They had no coercive authority-if they had, it must have been
exercised against the delinquent, states, which would be ineffectual, or terminate in a
separation.").
Counsel arguing before the Court used "coercion" to refer to the power of courts. See
United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 117 (court cannot reach out-of-state
debtors, "still they may appear without coercion."); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122
(4 Wheat.) (1819) (statement of Mr. Hunter, for Defendant) ("Whether a contract shall be
a matter for judicial coercion"); id. at 188 (statement of Mr. Hopkinson, for Plaintiff) ("If
the right of coercing the debtor by imprisonment"); The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 436, 442
(1823) (statement of Mr. Ogden and Mr. Winder, for Defendant) ("donec nostra custodia
coercertur" (captured ship is ours while in our custody)); Thelusson v. Smith, 15 U.S. (2
Wheat.) 396, 409 (1817) (statement of Mr. Jones, Defendant in Error) (judgment
creditor's advantage gained by "sheer coercion upon his debtor," and operation of law;
argument that United States, as creditor, has preference gives U.S. "a more extensive and
coercive remedy against an ordinary debtors"). Other counsel spoke of judicial and
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As the Court itself is fond of pointing out, Madison said that at
the Constitutional Convention, "The practicability of making laws,
with coercive sanctions, for the states as political bodies, had been
exploded on all hands."'" But Madison's language proves my point.
When the Founders talked about "coercion," they meant government
use of arms, either through the military or through judicial decisions
enforced by the military. Offers to give states money, even with
strings attached, are far different than the barrel of the gun.2'°
When Justice Cardozo wrote Steward Machine in 1937,
"coercion" retained its association with military or judicial power.
Justice Cardozo asked if the taxing and spending programs at issue
were "weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of
the states."2 ' Contemporary legal dictionaries said coercion will be
military coercion. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 377 (1819)
(statement of Mr. Pinkney, for Plaintiff in error) (Articles of Confederation gave national
government "no power of coercion but by arms" against states); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388,
409 (1815) (statement of Mr. Emmett, for Appellant) (recognizing, in challenge to U.S.
privateer's capture of neutral goods in belligerent vessel, that nations may retaliate as
"means of coercing justice from the other party."); The Aurora, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 203,
215 (1814) (statement of Mr. Pinkney, for Appellee) (war-time American embargo on
West Indies "was one of the means which the United States were using to coerce the
enemy").
One attorney spoke of the President's authority as commander in chief. The Thomas
Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 421, 426 (1814) (statement of Mr. Pinkney, for owners)
(attacking legality of ship's capture by U.S. privateers on grounds that U.S. president
"cannot coerce the privateers of the United States to do what he pleases," but may
restrain them.").
199. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION of 1787, at 9 (M.
Farrand ed. 1911), quoted in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164 (1992); Alden,
527 U.S. at 714; Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997).
As an example, the Court might have cited Professor Orth's thesis that the unwillingness
of post-Reconstruction America to go to war to force southern states to honor bonds on
which they had defaulted caused the Court to interpret the Eleventh Amendment to give
states far more immunity than the text or history of the Amendment permitted. ORTHO,
supra note 23.
200. The contrast between the Founders' understanding of coercion and the modern
interpretation becomes even clearer in Professor Sullivan's description of the
Unconstitutional Conditions doctrine:
Coercion in this context obviously does not take the form of force or fraud; the
beneficiary who accepts or rejects a conditioned benefit ostensibly expresses
some kind of voluntary choice between the right and the benefit. One way to
explain the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, however, is to view coercion as
possible even in the absence of force or fraud, and even in an apparently
consensual bargain; many private and criminal law doctrines and accounts of
coercive offers in moral philosophy take the same view.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1419-20
(1989).
201. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 596 ("To find state destruction" in the federal
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"implied when a person is legally under subjection to another and
forced to act contrary to his will"; they laconically noted that married
women provide the "principal case."2"2  A decade after Justice
Cardozo wrote, Black's Law Dictionary defined coercion to mean
"Compulsion, constraint, compelling by force or arms... constrained
by subjugation,"2 °3 a meaning very similar to the Framers'.
On the other hand, Justice Cardozo's discussion of coercion goes
beyond a fear of federal arms. Do the conditions require "a
surrender by the states of powers essential to their quasi-sovereign
existence"?" 4 Do they impair state autonomy?"0  Those questions
suggest a meaning that focuses less on the process used to produce
consent than on the substantive results sought.2
Under Justice Cardozo's approach, we might ask if Congress has
demanded states surrender essential attributes of sovereignty0 7 or
powers essential to their quasi-sovereign existence." But sovereign
immunity is not an "essential attribute" of sovereignty. States may
waive their immunity to suit.2" They are not immune from suits by
the United States for monetary damages for misusing federal funds,2°
and they may be sued in another state's courts.' Their officials must
statute imposing conditions "is to find it almost anywhere.").
202. See, e.g., BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (Baldwin's Ed., 1928) at 182; BALDWIN'S
LAW DICTIONARY at 182 (1926); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (4th ed. 1951).
203. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 324 (4th ed. 1951).
204. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 586, 595, 597.
206. Cf. Arthur R. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 486-87 (1967) (distinguishing procedural and substantive
unconscionability in contract law).
207. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 595, 597.
208. Id. at 593 ("surrender by the states of powers essential to their quasi-sovereign
existence"); id. at 596 ("abdicates its functions"); id. at 597 ("The inference of
abdication"). See also Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1989) (coercion
test based on fear that Spending Power would let Congress "infringe on integral state
functions."). This idea reappears in Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Nat'l League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976), which, of course, was overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
209. The Court first recognized this in Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 883 (1883)
(Immunity is "personal privilege which [a state] may waive at pleasure"), and later
allowed states to waive its immunity regarding contracts made with private citizens,
Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906).
210. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 775 (1983).
211. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (California residents injured in car crash by
employee of Nevada could sue Nevada in California state courts).
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obey federal court orders for prospective injunction relief.212 None of
those rules could be true if immunity was an essential attribute of
sovereignty.
One also could argue that sovereign immunity lets a state
allocate its scarce resources as it believes best for its constituencies,
and that meaning is consistent with a common account of the
Eleventh Amendment's origin. 2' Again, that has not stopped the
Court from approving a state's waiver of its immunity in a private
contract -presumably, the state assesses and allocates its financial
resources at the time it enters the contract. And while the Court has
expressed concerns that some prospective injunctive awards against
state officials may interfere with the state budgeting process, those
concerns simply "may counsel moderation in determining the size of
the award or in giving the state time to adjust its budget before paying
the full amount of the fee.,
214
Another of Justice Cardozo's constitutional concerns was
whether federal demands interfered with state autonomy by reducing
the accountability of state officials to their constituents. 5 Justice
O'Connor made this a major theme in her 1992 discussion of
coercion, warning that if Congress forced state officials to take certain
212. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 676-77
(1974).
A related concern would be whether Congress has asked a state to give up inalienable
rights and authority. Professor Sullivan identifies, but does not endorse, this approach,
Kathleen M. Sullivan, supra, note 200 at 1421, and Justice O'Connor has warned that since
federalism "secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign
power," state officials cannot consent when Congress exceeds its authority relative to the
states. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181-82, (quoting Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). But to call sovereign immunity an
inalienable right would conflict with the Court's recognition that states may waive their
immunity, see cases cited in supra note 209. Indeed, the Constitution (Art. IV, § 3) permits
a state to go so far as to consent to give up part of its territory.
213. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1354-55 (1989) (citing Chief Justice Marshall's discussion in Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, at 406-07 (1821) that Eleventh Amendment was
adopted because of state fiscal crises and fears of being required to repay heavy state
debts).
214. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 692 n.18 (1978); see also Edelman, 415 U.S.at 665-
68, 666 n.ll (expressing concerns on awards that require payment from state treasuries,
but upholding prospective injunctive relief with the ancillary effect of requiring state
officials to spend money); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 n.16 (1979) (describing
earlier cases' concern of placing "enormous fiscal burdens on the States" but stating that
such a situation "might require" a "formal indication" of Congressional intent to abrogate
state immunity).
215. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168-69; Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at
586, 595,597.
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action, voters might blame those state officials, rather than the federal
officials who really made the decision."6 But a federal spending
program conditioned on a waiver of a state's sovereign immunity
would increase the accountability of state officials. Today, a state
enjoys immunity without any requirement that its officials make an
affirmative decision. When a state injures a person, that person's
attorney's knowledge of the Eleventh Amendment means that he or
she usually will omit the state from the list of named defendants or
not even file the case. Such omissions require no action or decision
by state officials, nor do they produce a court decision which
newspapers may report.
Under the proposal this article puts forth, a plaintiff's attorney
would name the state as a defendant, and state officials then would
have to decide whether to invoke sovereign immunity. If they did,
the state would lose federal funds in the program in which the state's
induced waiver concerned, generating substantial headlines. Voters
might begin to ask why state officials were willing to sacrifice federal
dollars for the sole purpose of not having to appear in a federal court.
So much for coercion according to the Founders of 1787 and
Justice Cardozo of 1937. What has the modern Court done with the
word in the context of federalism? The Court has thrice distinguished
Conditional Spending programs from federal efforts to compel state
obedience or commandeer state officials. In 1985, Justice White
wrote "The Federal Government, however, has not presumed to
dictate the manner in which the counties may spend [money from a
federal spending program]. Rather, it has merely imposed a
condition on its disbursement of federal funds." '217 In 1992, Justice
O'Connor repeated that distinction. While condemning federal
efforts to coerce states, 8 she contrasted impermissible Congressional
coercion with permissible Congressional action:
This is not to say that Congress lacks the ability to encourage a
State to regulate in a particular way, or that Congress may not
hold out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a
State's policy choices. Our cases have identified a variety of
216. New York, 505 U.S..at 169-70.
217. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985).
218. In discussing Hamilton's vision of a federal standing army to enforce federal
requisitions on various states, O'Connor used "coercion" or its derivatives six times in
three pages, New York, 505 U.S. at 164-66, and then wrote that Congress "lacks the power
to compel the states to require or prohibit" certain acts. Id. at 166-67. This was consistent
with the Founders' meaning of coercion as military force or judicial decree supported by
military force.
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methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may
urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with
federal interests. Two of these methods are of particular
relevance here. First, under Congress' spending power,
'Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal
funds.'219
She repeated this flat distinction between coercion and conditional
funding twice.22°
And in 1997, Justices Scalia and O'Connor again distinguished
coercion and funding. Even as he invalidated the Brady Bill's
requirement that state officials help implement federal gun controls,
Justice Scalia distinguished between "conditions upon the grant of
federal funding" and "mandates to the States."22' Justice O'Connor's
concurrence went a step further. She suggested that if Congress
really wanted state officials to conduct gun checks for the federal
government, it should create a system of conditional funding."
In short, whether one uses a 1787, 1937, or 1987 perspective on
coercion as a constitutional concept, conditioning funds on a waiver
of immunity is safe.
c. Coercion as a contractual concept
As in constitutional law, contract law at the time of the Founders
limited "coercion" to threats of physical force. Blackstone said
coercion and duress involved only threats "sufficient to put a brave
man in fear of loss of life, of mayhem, or of imprisonment. '23 But not
all threats of physical force were sufficient: he pointedly wrote that
threats to commit battery, burn a house, or destroy goods were not
219. Id. at 166-67 (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 206).
220. New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (Congress may use conditional spending or "any other
permissible method of encouraging a state to conform to federal policy choices"); id. at
176 ("Congress has not held out the threat of exercising its spending power or its
commerce power; it has instead held out the threat ... of simply forcing the states to
submit to another federal instruction.").
221. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917-18 (1997).
222. "Congress is ... free to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance
on a contractual basis with the states if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal
programs. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 402 (conditioning states' receipt of federal funds for
highway safety program on compliance with federal requirements.)" Id. at 936 (O'Connor,
J. concurring).
223. I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 126-27 (1765)
(Univ. of Chi. facsimile ed.). RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 492, cmt. e (1932)
("Traditionally," coercion and duress limited to threats against life, loss of limb, or
imprisonment).
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coercion or duress.224
The meaning of "coercion" and "duress" had begun to change
by the time Justice Cardozo used those words in Steward Machine.
Some sources retained the original, restrictive meaning.225 In other
sources, the meanings ascribed to those terms had expanded to
include threats to injure or wrongfully imprison a spouse, child, or
near relative, or to wrongfully destroy, seize, or withhold land,
blackmail, and a complete lack of will, such as a signature made under
hypnosis.226 In 1937 (the year of Steward Machine), Williston noted
that some states had begun to recognize economic duress,227 and the
private plaintiff in Steward Machine invoked that new concept.
28
Justice Cardozo rejected it, saying that persuasion and pressure were
not coercion.22' That rejection was consistent with his decisions for
the New York Court of Appeals, which used "coercion" in the
context of a court's power to enforce its orders.230 In short, if we use
"coercion" as Justice Cardozo intended, a condition placed on a gift
of federal funds to a state would fall far short.
Even modern concepts of coercion and duress would not label
224. Id. at 127.
225. The legal dictionaries of Justice Cardozo's time used an even more limited
definition. See, e.g., BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 330 (1934) (force or imprisonment or
railroad's refusal to carry goods); BALDWIN'S LAW DICTIONARY 182, (1926) (same).
226. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 493 (a)-(d); according to § 493, comment a,
threats of imprisonment, physical injury or wrongfully seizing land are "the commoner"
examples of duress. All of the duress illustrations to §§ 492, 493, and 495 involve threats
of physical violence, § 493, illus. 1 and 4, § 494, illus. 1 and 2; imprisonment, § 493, cmt. b
and c; of blackmail, § 493, illus. 2, 3, 7, 18, and 19; seizing a valuable or badly needed item,
§ 493, Ill. 5-9, 12-14, 16, and 20; or the complete lack of will (a signature made under
hypnosis), § 493, illus. 3. A threatened suit that might ruin the victim's business is not
duress. § 493, illus. 10.
227. SAMUEL E. WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1618, at 4519-20, 4522-23 (1937). He
said "economic duress," included liens on realty, § 1618, at 4519; threats that a utility
would cut off service, § 1618, at 4520-21; and payments to avoid illegal forfeitures of
franchises, § 1618, at 4522-23. Black's Law Dictionary did not add "duress of goods" until
1951.
228. 301 U.S. at 587 ("economic pressure").
229. Id. at 587-88.
230. A WESTLAW search for ju(Cardozo) & (Duress coerc!) & da(before 1945)
produced 18 hits, which either discussed judicial coercion, (e.g., Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit
Co., 179 N.E. 373, 375 (N.Y. 1932) ("coerced by legal process" to pay debt); Finsilver Still
& Moss v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 171 N.E. 579, 580 (N.Y. 1930) (court order "to coerce
response to a petition"); In re Brown, 150 N.E. 581, 584 (N.Y. 1926) ("a sale coerced by
law"); Oswego & S.R. Co. v. State, 124 N.E. 8, 10 (N.Y. 1919) ("coercive power of the
state")) or were too general to provide a definition (e.g., Cox v. Lykes Bros., 143 N.E. 226,
227-28 (N.Y. 1924) (absence of duress); People v. Teuscher, 162 N.E. 484, 485 (N.Y. 1928)
("not merely by coercion")).
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conditional spending as coercive. While many -but not all- states
now recognize economic duress, that doctrine requires a threat that
leaves the victim "no reasonable alternative, '232 because similar goods
or services are not available in the open market.233 A refusal to pay
money is not duress, since the victim can find alternative funds by
borrowing, or, in the case of a state, by taxation.235
Another element of economic duress is an improper threat, and
there is no impropriety if the proposed exchange is fair.236 So what is
a fair trade for a waiver of state sovereign immunity? Unfortunately,
there is no market for immunity that we can use to set a price for a
waiver -a state that insists on preserving its dignity237 when dealing
with private contractors will find their attention shifting to more
creditworthy customers,238 rather than calculating a premium to
charge for the increased risk a state seeks to impose.
So what is a fair price to pay for a waiver of immunity? The
salaries the federal government will save when it does not have to
hire more attorneys to enforce a program's regulations? The average
annual amount of attorneys' fees generated in the past by private
lawsuits regarding similar programs? But how does one calculate the
value to the commonwealth of the United States, the value of
knowing that private citizens will be able to enjoy the protection of
federal rules and regulations, even if a U.S. Attorney's Office or an
agency's in-house counsel have neither the time nor motivation to
start their own enforcement proceedings? We know from Dole that a
five percent reduction in a grant is only "mild encouragement, 239
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2). For states retaining the
traditional meaning, see, e.g., Hovendick v. Presidential Fin. Corp., 497 S.E.2d 269, 272
(Ga. App. 1998); Holland v. High-Tech Colleries, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 1021, 1037 (N.D. W.
Va. 1996); FDIC v. Meyer, 755 F. Supp. 10, 13 (D.D.C. 1991); Prod. Credit Ass'n of East
Cent. Wisc. v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul, 781 F. Supp. 595,604 n.7 (D. Minn. 1991).
232. § 175(1) and cmt. b.
233. Id. at § 175 cmt. b.
234. Id. However, illustration 7 finds duress when the victim urgently needs cash
promised by a contract, in order to avoid a foreclosure, and is unable to borrow the money
elsewhere.
235. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989).
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 cmt. a (1981).
237. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712, 735-40. In contrast, the Eleventh Amendment limits only
the "Judicial power of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
238. Cf. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, CONDUCT OF LIFE: WORSHIP ("The louder he
talked of his honor, the faster we counted our spoons."), quoted in THE HOME BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS 198 (1967 Dodd Mead & Co., Bruce Bohle, ed.).
239. 483 U.S. at 211.
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suggesting that larger amounts providing "strong encouragement"
also would be permissible. Actually, this uncertainty works in favor
of conditional spending, since the party claiming duress is the party
who must prove its existence.
d. Other problems with the coercion test
Whether constitutional or contractual, whether defined by the
Founders in 1787, Justice Cardozo in 1937, or Chief Justice Rehnquist
in 1987, three weaknesses lead to the conclusion that coercion has
limited, if any, value as a test of conditional spending.
First, a state cannot show coercion merely by proving that a
threat to cut off funds influenced its decision to waive immunity.2"
Instead, the Court assumes "freedom of the will as a working
hypothesis. ,,,4" and this assumption is supported by examples of
states that have successfully resisted the lure of federal money tied to
conditions.242
Second, a successful claim of coercion might not give the state
the remedy it wants, namely, the federal grant sans condition. In
contract, the normal remedy is to let the victim invalidate the entire
agreement, not merely the objectionable clause. 43 This would let
Congress withdraw the entire funding offer, rather than giving the
state what it wants.
Third, coercion simply does not make sense in the context of
federal grants. What coercer or oppressor gives large sums of money
to its alleged victim, which is what federal grants provide the states?
What oppressor provides more financial support than its alleged
victim for projects that will benefit the victim's constituents?2" What
240. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co, 301 U.S. at 589-90).
241. Id.
242. An example is the repeal of the statute that conditioned Medicaid grants upon a
state waiver. See notes 165 supra. Indeed, the Boren Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13) (1994), which created the private cause of action that nursing homes and
hospitals had used to sue states for violating the Medicaid program's requirements, was
repealed by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4711(a)(1), 111 Stat.
251, 507-08.
Another example is the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. § 672(f)-
(g) (1994). Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL. 181, 184-85 n.12 (1998) (less than half of the states have implemented OSHA,
despite heavy federal subsidization), citing Current Status of State Approved Plans, 1
EMPL. SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 1 5300-5840 (1996).
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 383 and cmt. a (1981).
244. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000) (Federal government pays two-thirds of program operating
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victims are so eager to be coerced that they have increased their own
taxes to raise the funds needed to match their oppressor's largesse?
245
What coercion victims increase their own spending to increase the
amount of money they receive from their alleged oppressor? 246 What
coercer knows that its actions (withholding money from a state) will
harm its constituents as much as the state's constituents? And, for
heaven's sake, is any coercer except Congress comprised of people
who are elected by the citizens of their alleged victims? As Justice
Cardozo asked, is it safe to assume that a concept like coercion "can
ever be applied with fitness to the relations between state and
nation"?21 7 The wisdom of Justice Cardozo's concern appears both in
the reluctance of the lower federal courts to find a particular
condition coercive and in their often-open hostility to coercion as a
test.
3. The lower federal courts
The lower federal courts have had fifteen years since Dole to
costs and 80% of computer expenses); Unsigned Editorial, Engineering Our Future Trust
Is Best Route for Tobacco Funds, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 5, 1999, at editorial
page ($42 million state expenditure on caring for indigent would attract $101 million in
federal Medicaid funds); Christopher Lee, Legislatures Seek to Insure Kids; Program
Would Expand Health Coverage for Needy, DALLLAS MORNING NEWS, March 5, 1999, at
IA (every dollar state spent on children's health insurance would result in three dollars in
federal matching funds).
245. See, e.g., Amy Pyle, California and the West: California Elections, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at A3 (efforts to raise cigarette taxes so as to increase federal
matching funds); Gary J. Remal, New Laws Focus on Children's Physical, Mental Health
Issues, KENNEBEC J., April 30, 1998, at 9 (Maine governor justifies $8 million tax increase
as providing "many times that amount in federal matching funds.").
246. Unsigned Editorial, Engineering Our Future Trust is Best Route for Tobacco
Funds, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 5,1999, at editorial page (Oklahoma's Republican
governor wants $42 million increase in state spending for Medicaid beneficiaries to attract
$101 million in matching federal funds); Chuck Ervin, Higher Ed Package Pushed, TULSA
WORLD, Apr. 21, 1999, at 1 (Oklahoma Republican governor seeks $30 million bond issue
to generate $60 million in federal matching funds); Holly A. Heysor, Capitol Digest: More
Funds for Substance Abuse Help in Jeopardy, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 5, 1999, at B2
(subcommittee of gubernatorial health care commission calls for sufficient state spending
to obtain maximum federal matching funds); Jennifer Peter, $40 Million Proposal Would
Save Open Spaces, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 19, 2000, at B1 ($40 million in state
conservation spending could produce same amount in federal matching funds); Lara
Jakes, Ads Target Pataki's Proposed Health Cuts, ALBANY TIMES UNION, June 8, 1999 at
B2 (critics of governor say Medicaid budget cuts would total $2.1 billion because of lost
federal matching funds); Christopher Lee, Legislatures Seek to Insure Kids; Program
Would Expand health Coverage for Needy, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 5, 1999, at 1A
(supporters of additional state appropriations for medical services say $150 million annual
increase in appropriations would produce $450 million in federal funds).
247. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 590.
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define "coercion," and the results are cold comfort to conditional
spending opponents. Of the fifty-nine post-Dole cases I identified
that address the constitutionality of conditional spending, only one
came close to using a state's claim of coercion to invalidate a
conditional spending program. ' In contrast, six cases invalidated
programs because of Dole's unambiguous statement test 249 or other
problems. 250
In part, the lower federal courts' extreme reluctance to find
coercion comes from Steward Machine and Dole, both of which
expressly assumed that states have free will in choosing to accept
federal funds. Many courts have said that states are free to reject
federal grants: the choice between agreeing to the condition and
losing the money may be difficult, but difficult choices still are
choices. 251' The only case that came close to invalidating federal
248. In Va. Dep't of Educ v. Riley, the court used Dole's unambiguous statement test
to prevent the Secretary of Education from imposing conditions not expressly mandated
by the statute. 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997). The court also said that the Secretary's
threat to cut off all $60 million in federal funding for 128,000 students because Virginia
refused to provide private education to 126 disabled students "resembles impermissible
coercion." Id.
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990), involved a federal statute that
conditioned all funding for the District of Columbia on adoption of D.C. Appropriations
Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462 (Oct. 1, 1988). The majority found the dispute moot, but
one judge found it coercive. 915 F.2d at 708-9 (Buckley, J., concurring).
249. The most common reason was that a statute failed to clearly state the condition.
See Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park & River Forest High Sch., 115 F.3d 1273, 1277 (7th
Cir. 1997); Tenn. Dep't of Human Serv. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 979 F.2d 1162, 1167-68 (6th
Cir. 1992) (discussing Randolph-Shepard Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 107 and 107f); Riley, 106 F.3d
at 561, 566-67; McNabb, 862 F.2d at 686, 687.
250. McGinty, 251 F.3d at 95 (plaintiffs failed to identify federal statute under which
state had waived immunity); Yorktown Med. Lab., Inc. v. Perales, 948 F.2d 84, 87-88 (2d
Cir. 1991) (Congress had repealed statutes providing plaintiffs cause of action and
requiring state to waive immunity).
251. Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d, 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1035 (2000) ("a difficult choice remains a choice"; state free to make hard choice of
rejecting funding and conditions); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 552 (4th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000) (state may remain accountable to voters
simply by declining federal funds); United States v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 154 F.3d
870, 873 (8th Cir. 1998) (state may avoid conditions "simply by declining to apply" for
federal funds); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (no
coercion even though state has grown dependent on federal funds: state can make hard
choice of raising taxes); Pavadan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) (states free
not to participate in Medicaid); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (state
can raise taxes; federal conditions merely create "hard political choice"); Alabama v.
Lyng, 811 F.2d 567, 569 (11th Cir. 1987) (state free to reject condition by rejecting funds
and foregoing benefits to citizens); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Dandoy, 810
F.2d 984, 988 (10th Cir. 1987) (state can use own funds to replace federal funds); Gorrie v.
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conditional spending on grounds of coercion involved a threat to
cancel a state's entire grant for a minor violation of federal rules.252
But other courts have found there was no coercion when between
sixty-six and one hundred percent of a grant was at risk,253 or even
when a billion dollars was at stake.254 Nor have they been concerned
that losing the grant would be painful.
Accompanying this strong presumption against coercion is the
lower federal courts' often-open hostility toward coercion as a test.
Some have complained the test is difficult to apply,256 others have
Bowen, 809 F.2d 508, 519 (8th Cir. 1987) (state can avoid condition by avoiding money);
Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1133 (D. Kan. 2000) (difficult choice still is a
choice); Hatmaker v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 973 F. Supp. 1047, 1053 (M.D. Ga. 1995) ("No
one forced the state to seek federal funding, to accept federal participation, or to
commence construction of a federal aid highway.") (quoting Named Individual Members
of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Tex. Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013, 1028 (5th Cir.
1971)); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (E.D. Mo. 1996), vacated on
other grounds, 109 F.3d 440 (8th Cir. 1997) (state's citizens can decide whether to put more
money into program); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 710 F. Supp. 1532, 1546
(W.D. Wis. 1989) (state can choose to forgo federal highway funding).
252. Riley, 106 F.3d at 560 (Secretary of Education threatened to withhold all federal
funding for 128,000 students because of Commonwealth's conduct regarding only 126
students). See also Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699, 708-9 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Buckley,
J., concurring) (federal statute coercive because it conditioned all funding for District of
Columbia).
253. Jim C. v. Arkansas, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied,
533 U.S. 945 (2001) (no coercion despite dissent's complaint that condition put at risk one
hundred percent of $250 million federal funding to education); Kansas v. United States,
214 F.3d 1196, 1198, 1200-02 (10th Cir. 2000) (no coercion even though federal funds in
question were 66% of state's program operating costs and 80% of expenses for specific
part of program; no coercion even if removal of funding would "devastate state medical
system") (citing Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401 (10th Cir. 1981); California v.
United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding Medicaid conditions despite
state's claim that its participation in Medicaid is no longer voluntary, since medical system
would collapse without federal funding); Skinner, 884 F.2d at 446, 454 (no coercion even
though statute conditioned 95% of Nevada's highway funds on state reduction of speed
limit); Milwaukee Co. Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 710 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (W.D. Wis. 1989)
(Upholding conditions affecting $200 million of state's $300 million highway budget).
254. Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 525 and 926 F. Supp. at 540, 542-43
(rejecting Commonwealth request to develop record re potential loss of $1 billion in
federal highway funds).
255. Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S.
945 (2001) (loss of twelve percent of state's education funds would be "painful" but not
coercive); Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 546 (E.D. N.C. 1991)
(no coercion even though federal Medicare funding "essential" to operation of many
hospitals).
256. Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d at 1202 (courts "not suited to evaluating" if
state faces offer it cannot refuse or merely "hard choice"; other courts have refused to
"enter this thicket") (quoting Schweiker, 655 F.2d at 414); Kansas v. United States, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 1192, 1198 (D. Kan. 1998) (courts should avoid becoming entangled in coercion
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bemoaned the Supreme Court's lack of guidance. 7 For example,
while Dole did not explain why a threat of losing five percent of a
grant was "mild encouragement," '258 the Ninth Circuit bluntly listed a
series of questions that Dole did not begin to address:
Does the relevant inquiry turn on how high a percentage of the
total programmatic funds is lost when federal aid is cut-off? Or
does it turn, as Nevada claims in this case, on what percentage
of the federal share is withheld? Or on what percentage of the
state's total income would be required to replace those funds?
Or on the extent to which alternative private, state, or federal
sources of highway funding are available?25 9
Those questions provide a clue as to the depth of the lower
courts' implicit hostility to coercion as a test. Twelve years have
passed since the Ninth Circuit asked its questions, but I cannot find a
single court that has tried to provide a legal framework in which to
answer them. This implicit hostility to coercion also appears in the
lower federal courts' attitudes toward developing the facts. Although
coercion and duress are fact-intensive doctrines,2'6 of the fifty-nine
post-Dole spending cases I considered in researching this article,
forty-one were decided without a trial,261 and only sixteen said how
issues; coercion test "ill-conceived and probably unworkable ...."); Skinner, 884 F.2d at
448 ("The difficulty if not the impropriety of making judicial judgments regarding a state's
financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly suspect as a method for resolving
disputes between the federal and state governments."); Virginia v. United States, 926 F.
Supp. at 543 (E.D. Va. 1995) (difficulty of using coercion test creates "serious doubts"
whether coercion test is "viable"); Missouri v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (E.D.
Mo. 1996) (difficult for court to apply coercion test), vacated on other grounds, 109 F.3d
440 (8th Cir. 1997).
257. Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531
U.S. 1035 (2000) ("boundary between incentive and coercion has never been made
clear"); Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448 (state unable to give "principled definition" of
"coercion"); Robinson v. Kansas, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1131 n.6 (D. Kan. 2000) (coercion
is just a "buzzword").
258. 483 U.S. at 211-12.
259. Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448.
260. Schweiker, 655 F.2d at 414; Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198 (D.
Kan. 1998), affid, 214 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Schweiker, 655 F.2d at 406).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (1981) asks the court to determine if
the victim had a reasonable alternative, if the deal was fair, if the parties were experienced
adversaries of relatively equal bargaining power, if the alleged victim had the subjective
ability to resist, and if the contract was dictated by general economic forces.
261. Thirty-eight of these involved motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.
Three involved reviews of administrative agency decisions, e.g., California v. United
States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir. 1997); Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 519 (4th
Cir. 1996); Hou. Auth. of Ft. Collins v. United States, 980 F.2d 624, 626 (10th Cir. 1992);
Alabama v. Lyng, 811 F.2d 567, 568 (11th Cir. 1987); Kansas, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 1196;
United Seniors Ass'n, Inc. v. Shalala, 2 F. Supp. 2d 39, 40 (D.D.C. 1998) aff'd on other
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much money or what fraction of the federal grant was at stake.
Indeed, four courts expressly refused to allow states to develop the
factual record needed to establish coercion.
There is, as mentioned above, one case that does come close to
granting a state's request to invalidate a condition because of
coercion. In Virginia Department of Education v. Riley, the U.S.
Secretary of Education threatened to withhold $60 million in federal
grants intended to educate 128,000 handicapped children, unless the
Commonwealth spent $58,000 to privately educate 126 disabled
students who had been expelled for behavior unconnected with their
disability.263 The main reason for the en banc ruling was Dole's clear
statement requirement: the Secretary's request was based on a
condition inferred from, rather than expressly stated in, the federal
statute.264 But the court also warned that withholding all funds for all
disabled students "resembles impermissible coercion, if not forbidden
regulation in the guise of Spending Clause condition.
26
In striking down the condition, the en banc court adopted the
panel's dissent, which contained a rare effort to define coercion.
Judge Luttig said coercion occurs when the federal government
"withholds the entirety of a substantial federal grant on the ground
that the states refuse to fulfill their federal obligation in some
grounds, 182 F.3d. 965 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
262. Virginia v. United States, 74 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 1996) (refusing
Commonwealth's offer to "assemble a record" to show impact of conditions on its
highway budget and the "macro-economic effect" of sanctions; "Analysis of state
economies and state budgets and, operations has not been thought necessary to the
resolution of Spending Clause claims in the past.") (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 203, 210-11);
Schweiker, 655 F.2dat 414 ("We therefore follow the lead of other courts that have
explicitly declined to enter this thicket when similar funding conditions have been at
issue."); Virginia, 926 F. Supp. 537, 542 (E.D. Va. 1995) (rejecting Commonwealth's plea
to develop factual record; assuming coercion still is viable test, proper forum for factual
record is Congress); Missouri, 918 F. Supp. at 1328 (court's decision "would be essentially
unaffected by further factual development").
263. 106 F.3d at 562. The Department of Education said at oral argument that this
responsibility would extend even to a student expelled after being convicted of murder.
264. Id. at 561. The court could have avoided the constitutional issue by paying closer
attention to the contractual aspect of the grant. The Secretary was trying to suspend
performance of the grant/contract, and such suspension is appropriate only when the other
side has materially breached. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 585 (Aspen Law
and Business 3d ed.). Virginia had refused to serve 126 out of 128,000 students in the
program, less than one-tenth of one percent of the whole, which is far from a material
breach. In effect, the Secretary was demanding exact performance, and exact
performance is unavailable unless the contract expressly provides for it. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 cmt. d (1982).
265. Riley, 106 F.3d at 561.
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insubstantial respect rather than submit to the policy dictates of
Washington in a matter peculiarly within their powers as sovereign
states." '266
Obviously, this definition hardly will please opponents of
conditional spending, especially spending used to induce immunity
waivers. In 1977, Congress obtained the consent of 37 states by
threatening a mere ten percent of Medicaid funding," far short of
Judge Luttig's "entirety of a substantial federal grant."
In short, after fourteen years of field testing, Dole's coercion test
has not survived as a test when applied independently of the Dole
Four. The lower federal courts have not used it to invalidate federal
pressure; they have expressly criticized it as a test; they have
deliberately refused to engage in the legal and factual analysis it
requires. The only court that has tried has presented a definition that
imposes almost no limit on Congress. That should tell us a great deal.
4. Conditional Spending and City of Boerne
In 1997, City of Boerne v. Flores limited Congressional authority
to use the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.68 Since then, the Court has used Boerne to invalidate
other Congressional efforts to abrogate state sovereign immunity.269
But Boerne poses no danger to conditional spending. Boerne
concerns Congressional use of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and twenty years ago, Justice Rehnquist and the Court
expressly distinguished between section 5 legislation and legislation
adopted under the Spending Power.27
266. Id. at 570 (quoting Judge Luttig's dissent in Riley, 86 F.3d ay 1356).
267. See note 116, supra.
268. 521 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1997) (statute using § 5 must have "a congruence between
the means used and the ends to be achieved"; legislative history must contain sufficient
examples of state violations of rights Congress seeks to protect). In 1976, the Court had
said that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorized Congress to override the Eleventh
Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
269. See Bd. Of Trs. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-74 (2001)
(Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 101 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §12111-117 (2000));
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80-91 (2000) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §621 et seq. (1994 & Supp. III 1997));
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Euc. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-648
(1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1192, § 2, 35
U.S.C. §§271(h), 296 (2000)).
270. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1981). See also
Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park v. Kelly E., 207 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, Bd. of
Educ. of Oak Park v. I11. State Bd. of Educ., 531 U.S. 824 (2000).
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E. The Older Workers' Rights Restoration Act
In 2001, Senators James M. Jeffords (Ind.-Vt.), Edward M.
Kennedy (D-Wisc.), and Russell D. Feingold (D-Wisc.) introduced a
bill to override Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents271 by denying
federal aid to states that fail to waive immunity to suits for specified
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.27' The bill
has two major problems.
First, it uses the notion of constructive waiver. Instead of
requiring a state to affirmatively issue a waiver before receiving funds,
the bill construes a state's receipt of federal funds as a waiver.273 The
Court buried the remnants of constructive waiver back in 1999.274
Second, the bill's application to all state workers will violate Dole's
requirement that the condition be sufficiently related to "the federal
interest in particular projects or programs, 275 "reasonably calculated
to address [a] particular impediment to a purpose for which the
funds" were awarded.276 Congress bestows federal funds on states for
many reasons: caring for the indigent and elderly, building safe
highways, and providing education. But a state's discrimination
against a sixty-year-old civil engineer on a federal-state highway
project is not going to make the highway less safe. That sounds hard-
hearted, but the Rehnquist Court is quite willing to uphold hard-
hearted state decisions.277
The Conditional Spending power provides a powerful weapon
for a Congress that wants to override state sovereign immunity
regarding federal entitlement programs and education programs.
That power provides the ability to protect both the beneficiaries of
those programs and the businesses, such as nursing homes, that serve
those beneficiaries. But Conditional Spending will not help Congress
protect state employees, nor businesses harmed by state patent
infringements, state hospital price fixing, or state extortion of
preferential transfers from bankrupts trying to fend off private
271. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
272. Older Workers' Rights Restoration Act of 2001, S. 928, 107th Cong. (2001).
273. Id. at § 4 (amending Section 7(g) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626.). See also §§ 2(8) and 3(2).
274. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Post Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
275. 483 U.S. at 208.
276. Id. at 208-09.
277. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-68 (2001)
(existing caselaw lets states "quite hard headedly-and perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job
discrimination requirements which do not make allowance for the disabled.").
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creditors. To deal with those problems, corporate America must look
to Justice Scalia's statement that Congress may condition non-
monetary benefits on a state's waiver of immunity.278 That idea is the
subject of Part III of this Article.
III. Non-Monetary Benefits vis-a-vis State Waivers of
Sovereign Immunity
Just as College Savings Bank said that the gratuitous nature of
the Spending power lets Congress condition monetary grants to states
upon waivers of immunity,"9 the gratuitous nature of at least five
Article I enumerated powers should let Congress impose similar
conditions on grants of non-monetary benefits. In 1959, Petty v.
Tenn. -Mo. Bridge Comm'n found the Interstate Compact Clause gave
Congress such authority."' Today, the Copyright and Patent Clauses
provide more significant opportunities, and several commentators
have urged Congress to similarly use the Bankruptcy Power. 8
Before discussing those, however, I must turn to the Commerce
Clause. At first glance, that provision does not appear to contain any
benefits that Congress might bestow on states, but it has produced at
least two dozen published opinions in which the lower federal courts
have assessed the authority of Congress to induce states to waive
their immunity. In March 2001, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
on this very question,282 but later expressly declined to answer it. 3
278. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 687.
279. 527 U.S. 666, 686-87 (1999).
280. 359 U.S. 275, 276-82 (1959).
281. See Troy A. McKenzie, Note, Eleventh Amendment Immunity in Bankruptcy:
Breaking the Seminole Tribe Barrier, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199, 236-40 (2000); Laura B.
Bartell, Getting to Waiver - A Legislative Solution to State Sovereign Immunity in
Bankruptcy After Seminole Tribe, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 17, 93-102 (2000); Kenneth N. Klee
et al., State Defiance of Bankruptcy Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1584-91 (1999).
282. See I11. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted sub nom. Mathias v. WorldCom Tech., Inc., 532 U.S. 903 (2001) (certiorari was
granted limited to the following questions, among others: "Whether a state commission's
acceptance of Congress' invitation to participate in implementing a federal regulatory
scheme that provides that state commission determinations are reviewable in federal court
constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.").
The Court later consolidated Mathias with Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md.,
533 U.S. 928 (2001), and United States v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 533 U.S. 928 (2001).
The latter two cases derived from Bell Atlantic Md. Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, 240 F.3d 279
(4th Cir. 2001), which involved the same basic facts and issues as did Mathias.
283. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 2002 U.S. Lexis 3787, 122 S.Ct.
1753, 1760-61 (2002) (since Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permits plaintiffs to sue
individual commissioners in federal court, it is unnecessary to decide if state waived its
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Moreover, the Commerce Clause offers Congress the greatest
opportunity to protect state employees from the perils of state
sovereign immunity. So I shall begin there.
A. The Commerce Clause
1. The Telecommunication Act of 1996
a. Cooperative federalism284 meets the Eleventh Amendment
What possible benefit can Congress give states under the
Commerce Clause? The answer is simple: regulatory authority. I
doubt Congress was thinking of state immunity when it adopted the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,285 but the lower federal courts
overwhelmingly have recognized that the Act constitutionally offers
states a slice of regulatory authority in return for waivers of
immunity.
The 1996 Act sprang from decades of federal-state conflicts over
telephone service. In 1934, Congress created the Federal
Communications Commission (F.C.C.),2 6 in part to regulate interstate
telephone services, 7 leaving states in charge of intrastate networks.28
States gave an exclusive franchise in each local market to a single
carrier, who owned the entire local network.289 But in the 1990s, new
technology made competition in local markets possible, and the 1996
Act moved some-though not all-authority over this competition from
the states to the F.C.C.2
9
The Act requires local carriers to make their networks available
immunity under Telecommunications Act.).
284. Several courts have applied this term to the Telecommunications Act, e.g., P.R.
Tel. Co. v. Telecomm. Regulatory Bd. of P.R., 189 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1999); Bellsouth
Telecomm. Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Serv., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1368
(N.D. Ga. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 278 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2002).
285. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A.).
The 1996 Act amended the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A.).
286. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 601, 48 Stat. 1064, 1101, § 601 (1934).
287. Id. at § 1 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151).
288. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 932, (10th
Cir. 2000), citing the 1934 Act, § 2(b) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 152), cert.
denied, Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Qwest Communications Int'l Inc., 531 U.S. 1183
(2001).
289. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,371 (1999).
290. Id. at 379 n.6. This ended what Justice Scalia called "the longstanding regime of
state-sanctioned monopolies." Id. at 371.
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to competitors for a fee, which they must negotiate in good faith."1 If
negotiations fail, either side can ask a state commission to arbitrate.292
However, when the fee is set, by private negotiation or state
arbitration, the state commission must then approve or reject the
resulting fee agreement. If the commission fails to act, the fee
agreement is deemed approved,294 but the commission loses
jurisdiction to the F.C.C.295 If the state commission acts, an aggrieved
carrier may "bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court
to determine whether the [fee] agreement.., meets the [Act's]
,,296requirements. In other words, state commission regulation is
subject to federal court review, while a commission that does not
regulate that agreement loses all authority over it. The price of state
regulatory authority is federal court review. 7
Unfortunately, the Act did not specify the requirements for
aggrieved carriers filing suit in federal court,299 and many carriers
named the state commissions as defendants, implicating state
sovereign immunity. But by this time, Seminole Tribe had said that
the Commerce Clause (the basis for the Telecommunications Act)
did not let Congress abrogate state sovereign immunity.2 9 Aggrieved
carriers had only one argument left: the Act had induced states to
waive their immunity.
b. The pre-College Savings Bank decisions
Before College Savings Bank, ten federal courts published
decisions on the inclusion of a waiver in the Telecommunications Act.
Seven ruled against the states.3°° Only three trial judges ruled for a
291. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1) (2000).
292. 47 U.S.C. § 252(b)(1) (2000).
293. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(1) (2000).
294. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(4) (2000).
295. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(5) (2000).
296. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) (2000).
297. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 (1999).
298. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Serv., Inc., 97 F.
Supp. 2d 1363, 1373-74 (N.D. Ga. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 278 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir.
2002); Bell Atlantic-Del., Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218, 228 n.5 (D. Del. 2000).
299. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
300. MCI Telecomms. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n 183 F.3d 558, 564-67 (7th Cir. 1999),
vacated and set for rehearing, 183 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 1999); MCI Corp. v. I11. Commerce
Comm'n, 168 F.3d 315, 320-23 (7th Cir. 1999); AT&T Communications of Mich. v. Mich.
Bell Tel., 60 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639-41 (E.D. Mich. 1998); US West Communications, Inc. v.
TCG Or., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1245 (D. Or. 1998); Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. MFS Intelenet of
Mich., 16 F. Supp. 2d 817, 824-25 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (citing 14 unpublished opinions); US
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State,"' and one of those conceded that at least eighteen unpublished
cases disagreed with her. °2
Surprisingly, the pro-waiver courts relied on Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon,"3  which is usually read as restricting
Congressional ability to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity."°
Atascadero required Congress to make its intent clear in the statute's
text,05 and its opponents argued that it unfairly allowed States to
violate federal law.3°6 But the early Telecommunications Act cases
used Atascadero to infer that Congress can abrogate sovereign
immunity if it does so with sufficient clarity." Perhaps Congress had
West Communications v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301-02 (D.
Utah 1998); US West Communications, Inc. v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365, 1368-69
(W.D. Wash. 1997).
301. AT&T Communications of South Central States, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms.
Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599-602 (M.D. La. 1999), rev'd, 238 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001); Wis.
Bell v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155-59 (W.D. Wis. 1998); MCI
Telecomms. v. BellSouth Telecomms., 9 F. Supp. 2d 766,770 (E.D. Ky. 1998).
Although the Court has recognized Congressional authority over interconnection
agreements, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999), the three trial
courts wrongly assumed that the Act infringed on State authority over telephone service.
AT&T Communications of South Central States, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02, rev'd, 238
F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001); Wis. Bell, 27 F. Supp. at 1158; MCI Telecomms., 9 F. Supp. 2d at
770. The Court in MCI conceded that Congress had authority to impose the Act's
condition if it did so with sufficient clarity. Id.
302. Wis. Bell, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1157.
303. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
304. E.g., id. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority opinion "tightens the noose" by
excluding use of legislative history); PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 850 (Univ. Casebook Series
1998) (Atascadero lifted "'clear statement' test to new heights").
305. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 (Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity only if it makes its intent to do so "unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute .... "). Two earlier cases had suggested that it might be enough if Congress
manifested its intent in the statute's legislative history. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,
698 & n.31 (1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1988 abrogates Eleventh Amendment because of "history
focusing directly on the question of state liability"); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345
(1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment because it "does not
explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the immunity
of the State; nor does it have a history which focuses directly on the question of state
liability.").
306. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 255-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (clear statement
requirement inconsistent with federal court duty to provide fair and impartial forum to
enforce law).
307. MCI Telecomms. v. I11. Commerce Comm'n, 183 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 1999),
vacated and set for rehearing, 183 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 1999), aff'd, MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.
I11. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, cert. denied, Pub. Serv. Com'n of Wis. v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 531
U.S. 1132 (2001), cert. denied, I11. Commerce Comm'n v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 531 U.S.
1132 (2002); MCI Corp. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n, 168 F.3d 315, 321 (7th Cir. 1999);
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found a way around State sovereign immunity. But how would
College Savings Bank affect the situation?
c. The post-College Savings Bank cases
College Savings Bank's denunciation of constructive waivers. 8
created major problems for carriers attacking State commission
decisions, for the Telecommunication Act cases looked suspiciously
like the objects of Justice Scalia's wrath. A State can waive its
immunity only by a "clear declaration,"" such as a statute that
expressly mentions immunity. But in the Telecommunication Act
cases, State legislatures had not spoken. Instead, State commissions
allegedly had waived immunity by acting, by exercising jurisdiction
over a local exchange fee dispute. They had not clearly stated a
waiver; at best, they had constructively waived immunity. And
College Savings Bank obliterated the constitutionality of constructive
waivers.31°
The implications for the Telecommunications Act cases were
obvious, if frustrating."' The Sixth Circuit reacted by sidestepping the
issue, interpreting carrier appeals of State commission decisions as
claims for injunctive relief, as permitted under Ex parte Young." But
AT&T Communications of Mich. v. Mich. Bell Tel., 60 F. Supp. 2d 636, 641 (E.D. Mich.
1998); US West Communications, Inc. v. TCG Or., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1245 (D. Or. 1998)
(also relying on New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162, 167 (1992)); Mich. Bell Tel.
Co. v. MFS Intelenet of Mich., 16 F. Supp. 2d 817, 825 (W.D. Mich. 1998); MCI
Telecomms. v. BellSouth Telecomms., 9 F. Supp. 2d 766, 770 (E.D. Ky. 1998); US West
Communications v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301 (D. Utah
1998).
Another case, US West Communications, Inc. v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365, 1368-69
(W.D. Wash. 1997), cited a Ninth Circuit opinion, Premo v. Martin, 119 F.3d 764, 768 (9th
Cir. 1997), which was based on Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238.
308. 527 U.S. at 674-85.
309. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Great Northern Life Ins.
Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944)). See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (state must "unequivocally" express waiver).
310. 527 U.S. at 680-84, overruling Parden v. Terminal R.Y. Co. of Ala. Docks Dep't.,
377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
311. A Seventh Circuit panel had decided MCI Telecomms. v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n,
183 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1999), considered a request for rehearing, 183 F.3d at 560 n.2, and
amended its opinion, only to release it on the same day that College Savings Bank
appeared.
312. GTE North, Inc., v. Strand, 209 F.3d 909, 922 n.6 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub
nom. Strand v. Verizon North Inc., 531 U.S. 957 (2000); Mich. Bell Tel. v. Climax Tel., 202
F.3d 862, 867 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Strand v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 531
U.S. 816 (2000). See also Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. ICG Telecom Group, Inc., 2000 WL
1469356 at *3 (S.D. Ohio. Sept. 29, 2000) (Ex parte Young permits federal suit, regardless
[Vol. 29:3
Spring 2002] WAIVERS OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
other courts read all of Justice Scalia's opinion and reached his
distinction between gratuities and constructive waivers.313 As I
discussed earlier, Justice Scalia said Congress could condition
gratuities upon a waiver of immunity, using the Interstate Compact
and Spending Clauses as examples. And someone-I would dearly
love to know who-realized that the Telecommunication Act could be
read as bestowing a gratuity under the Commerce Clause: regulatory
power. In the name of cooperative federalism, Congress had seized
control of local telephone exchange competition and then offered the
States a slice of that control-if the States would submit to federal
judicial review. The Third,314 Fifth,315 Seventh,"6 and Tenth Circuits317
and at least four district courts agreed and ruled against the States,318
while the Eighth Circuit decided to let the trial courts confront the
issue.319 Only the Fourth Circuit32° and two district judges321 persisted
of waiver's validity and MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 112 F. Supp.
2d 1286, 1289 n.4 (N.D. Fla. 2000)).
313. 527 U.S. at 686-87.
314. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503-11 (3d Cir. 2001);
Bell-Atlantic v. Penn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 273 F.3d 337, 341 (3d Cir. 2001)..
315. ATT Communications v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643-47 (5th
Cir. 2001).
316. MCI Telecomms. Corps. v. I11. Bell Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 338-44 (7th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied sub nom. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis. v. Wis. Bell, Inc., 531 U.S. 1132 (2001),
and I11. Communications Comm'n v. MCI Telecomms. Corps., 531 U.S. 1132 (2001); I11.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Worldcom Tech., 179 F.3d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1999), affd on other grounds,
Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 2002 U.S. Lexis 3787, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 1760-
61 (May 20, 2002).
317. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929, 935-39 (10th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Utah v. Qwest Communications
Int'l Inc., 531 U.S. 1183 (2001).
318. Bell Atlantic-Penn., Inc. v. Penn. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 107 F. Supp. 2d 653, 660-62
(E.D. Pa. 2000); AT&T Communications of the Southwest Inc., v. Southwestern Bell Tel.,
86 F. Supp. 2d 932, 946-47 (W.D. Mo. 1999), rev'd in part, vacated in part, Southwestern
Bell Co. v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm.'n, 236 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2000); Bell Atlantic-Del., Inc.
v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218, 231-32 (D. Del. 2000); Bell-Atlantic-Del. v. Global
NAPS South, 77 F. Supp. 2d 492,499-500 (D. Del. 2000).
319. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Connect Communications Corp., 225 F.3d 942, 948-
49 (8th Cir. 2000).
320. Bell Atlantic Md., Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 287-94 (4th Cir.
2001), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md.,
2002 U.S. Lexis 3787, 122 S.Ct. 1753 (May 20, 2002).
321. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Servs., 97 F. Supp.
2d 1363, 1368-75 (N.D. Ga. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 278 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2002);
Wis. Bell v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 57 F. Supp. 2d 710, 715 (W.D. Wisc. 1999). Both courts
declined to recognize that Congress legitimately had assumed all regulation of the
interstate component of local exchange carriers and their competition. See BellSouth, 97
F. Supp. 2d at 1372 (Telecommunications Act coerces states by conditioning state
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in ruling for the States.
The most important aspect of these cases is their near-unanimous
recognition that if Congress speaks with sufficient clarity, it can trade
some of its regulatory authority to States in return for a waiver. At
the appellate level, only the Sixth Circuit has disagreed, using all of
three sentences.22  The Fourth Circuit did not address this issue;
instead, it used Congress's failure to clearly state an intent to impose
conditions.323
This summer, in Verizon Maryland Inc., v. Public Service
Commission of Maryland, the Court expressly declined to decide
whether Congress can trade some of its regulatory authority over
commerce in return for a State's waiver of sovereign immunity.
3 24
Instead, the Court found that telecommunications companies who
appealed a State commission decision to federal court were suing the
individual state commissioners, rather than the commission itself.
3 25
Such suits against individual state officers, of course, are permitted
under Ex parte Young.3 26 Verizon's practical effect is to leave in place
regulation of traditional state area); Wis. Bell, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 712, 715.
322. GTE North, Inc., 209 F.3d at 922 n.6.
323. Bell Atlantic Md., 240 F.3d at 292-93. Earlier, a trial judge had made the same
argument. See AT&T Communications of the South Central States v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599, 601 (M.D. La. 1999), rev'd, 238 F.3d 636 (5th
Cir. 2001).
324. 2002 U.S. Lexis 3787, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 1760-61 (May 20, 2002). Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 1760, citing Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Ex parte Young saved the Telecommunication Act from the difficult task of making
Congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity "unmistakably clear" in the
text of the statute. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). See also
AT&T Communications, 238 F.3d at 644 (Congress must put state "on notice clearly and
unambiguously by the federal statute") (citing Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 675-87); MCI
Telecomms., 222 F.3d at 340 (Congress must "speak with a clear voice" when asking State
to waive sovereign immunity) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). South Dakota v. Dole imposes a similar requirement of clarity, when
Congress conditions federal funds on a state taking certain action. 483 U.S. at 207 (1987).
The Telecommunication Act fails this clear notice requirement in two ways. Subsection
252(e)(4) says, "No State court shall have jurisdiction to review the action of a State
commission;" subsection 252(e)(6) says that an appeal from a state commission's decision
shall be by "an action in an appropriate Federal district court." Neither subsection
requires an appealing carrier to name as defendants the state commission or
commissioners who ruled on the fee disputes. Bell Atlantic-Md., 240 F.3d 279, 290-91 (4th
Cir. 2001), affd on other grounds, Verizon Md. Inc., v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 2002
U.S. Lexis 3787, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 1760-61 (May 20, 2002); BellSouth Telecomms. v.
MCIMetro Access Transmission Servs., Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1373-75 (N.D. Ga. 2000)
(Section 252(e) "remains altogether silent" as to whether state commissions are parties in
federal litigation), rev'd on other grounds, 278 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2002); Bell Atlantic-
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the Telecommunication Act's system of trading federal regulatory
authority in return for waivers of State immunity, and this result
provides Congress with opportunities whose constitutionality will not
hide behind Young.
2. Other uses of the Commerce Clause
The Telecommunication Act cases suggest that Congress can
trade federal regulatory authority for State waivers of immunity in
two other areas.
The first concerns employment discrimination, where the Court
repeatedly has invalidated Congressional efforts to abrogate State
sovereign immunity. Currently, federal law provides that an
employee can not file discrimination charges with the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission without first giving a State
administrative agency sixty days to resolve the dispute.327 This gives a
Del., Inc. v. McMahon, 80 F. Supp. 2d 218,228 n.5 (D. Del. 2000).
A more significant problem is that neither subsection mentions sovereign immunity or the
Eleventh Amendment. The Court has not always insisted that Congress use precisely the
same ritual incantations to override state sovereign immunity. Compare Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (requiring "the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable
construction") (quoting from Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909));
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (requiring Congress to make
intention "clear in the language of the statute."); and Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S., at 56
("unmistakably clear in the language of the statute") (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1989)). See also Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S.
468, 474 (1987) ("unmistakable statutory language"). In Seminole Tribe, the Court
stretched the "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" requirement to include a
statute that repeatedly referred to the States as if they were defendants in federal court.
See 517 U.S. at 56-57 (analyzing the Indian Gaming Regulation Act, 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(B)(ii)(II) (if Plaintiff Tribe meets its burden of proof, then "burden of proof
shall be upon the State .... ), § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (permitting federal court to "order the
State"), and § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) & (v) (state must "submit" to mediator or federal court)).
But the Telecommunication Act identifies neither state commissions or commissioners as
defendants. The Fourth Circuit relied heavily on this flaw in invalidating the Act. Bell
Atlantic-Md., 240 F.3d at 292-93 (4th Cir. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, Verizon Md. Inc.,
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 2002 U.S. Lexis 3787, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 1760-61 (May 20,
2002). The Seventh Circuit argued that § 252's structure made clear that Congress
intended to provide for federal court review of state commission decisions, MCI
Telecomms., 222 F.3d at 341, and the Fifth and Third Circuits agreed. AT&T
Communications, 238 F.3d at 646-47; MCI Telecomms., 271 F.3d at 512-13 (3rd Cir. 2001).
The Tenth Circuit did not explain its conclusion that § 252 provided sufficiently clear
notice. MCI Telecomms., 216 F.3d at 938 (10th Cir. 2000).
Even if the Act does provide states with sufficient notice, there is the question as to
whether a state commission on telecommunications has the authority to waive the state's
immunity. See A T& T Communications of South Central States, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d at 600.
327. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1994). Congress intended to "screen from the federal
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State some regulatory authority, just as the Telecommunication Act
does. Congress could adopt this mechanism for other civil rights
statutes, but States would get the opportunity to resolve an
employment discrimination case only if it had waived its own
immunity to suits regarding employment discrimination.
Environmental protection provides a similar opportunity.
Currently, in some areas Congress gives States a choice. If a State
adopts a regulatory program that meets federal guidelines, that State
(and not the federal government) will have sole enforcement
authority; in States without such a program, federal regulation and
enforcement will preempt State law.128 This seems to be a grant of
regulatory authority similar to that provided by the
Telecommunications Act. Indeed, such an argument has been made
to the Fourth Circuit in the context of the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977,329 under which the federal government
offers States the choice between federal regulation of strip mines or
exclusive State regulation, as long as the State adopts and enforces
standards at least as strict as the federal government's.330 The Fourth
Circuit rejected the argument, but only because the relevant federal
statute had not unequivocally and clearly warned States that
submitting a program for federal approval would waive their
immunity.31
The use of induced waivers in employment discrimination and
environmental matters is significantly different from the
courts those problems of civil rights that could be settled to the satisfaction of the grievant
in a 'voluntary and localized manner."' See 110 CONG. REC. 12725 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey). The section is intended to give state agencies a limited opportunity to
resolve problems of employment discrimination and thereby make it unnecessary to resort
to federal relief by victims of the discrimination. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 755 (1979). See also Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 825 (1990)
("The first hiatus is designed to give state administrative agencies an opportunity to
invoke state rules of law.").
328. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-69 (1992) (citing Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). Justice O'Connor
pointed to the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq.; the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2796, as amended 42 U.S.C. §
6901, et seq.; and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2374, 16
U.S.C. § 3101, etseq. Id. at 167-169.
329. 30 U.S.C. § 1201, et seq. (2000).
330. See Bragg v. West Virgina, 248 F.3d 275, 288-90, 293-95 (4th Cir. 2001) (describing
statute's mechanics); cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002).
331. Id. at 298-99. Instead, the act's citizen suit provision explicitly says it permits suits
against states only to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment. 30 U.S.C. §
1270(a)(2) (1982).
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Telecommunications Act in one major way. An aggrieved carrier
who names a State commission as a defendant does so only to enable
the federal court to enjoin the State commission's order. If the
federal court finds that a State commission wrongly approved or
rejected an interconnection agreement, no State funds are at risk: the
underlying dispute was between the two litigating carriers, one of
whom may be liable for damages. But what if a State preserves the
authority of its own equal employment commission by waiving its
immunity in matters of employment discrimination? Some of the
appeals from the commission to a federal court will involve disputes
in which the State is the underlying defendant, and State funds will be
at risk. That would create a classic conflict with the Eleventh
Amendment.332 Similarly, if Congress traded authority to regulate the
environment in exchange for a State waiver of immunity in
employment disputes, that State's treasury might also be at risk.333
Unlike Verizon, Ex parte Young's tolerance of suits for injunctive
relief against individual state officials will not provide an escape
hatch.
B. The Copyright and Patent Clauses
1. The problem
Since we know that States can infringe intellectual property
rights without fear of monetary liability,334 the question arises whether
332. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't. of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
333. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1989) (suit against
Commonwealth, which had owned hazardous waste site, for monetary relief under
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613).
334. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
634-38 (1999) (invalidating §§ 271(a) and 296(a), Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did not abrogate state
immunity, nor did state's participation in interstate commerce waive such immunity).
The lower federal courts have split. Some ruled against the states. Mills Music, Inc. v.
Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 101, abrogated
state immunity), disapproved by BV Eng'g v. U.C.L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1397 n.1 (9th Cir.
1988); Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(state's institution of patent infringement action against private defendant constructively
waived state's immunity to counterclaim), vacated and remanded, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999);
New Star Lasers v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(patent is gift or gratuity bestowed by federal government, so state waived immunity when
applied for patent); and McGuire v. Univ. of Mich., No. 2:99CV1231, 2000 WL 1459435, at
*3-5 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 21, 2000) (university's application for trademark waived immunity).
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copyrights, patents, and trademarks may be considered the type of
gratuities described in College Savings Bank? The answer depends
on whether an author or inventor has a property right to such
protection. The text of Art. I, Section 8, Clause 8 gives a clear answer
when it says Congress "shall have Power... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." '335 This language gives power but does not mandate its
use by Congress. Nor does it indicate that an author or inventor has
an inherent property right in her work.336 Unlike Article IV, Section
2, Clause 1, which says "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States," the
intellectual property clause does not recognize that any author or
inventor is entitled to anything.337
The clause's history reinforces this point. According to Edward
C. Walterscheid, English and American common law both said that
an inventor had no right to protection,"' and the Supreme Court
agreed in 1834."39 As Walterscheid describes, the issue of an author's
right was more controversial. In 1769, the King's Bench had said the
author had a common law right to protection," ° but the House of
Lords reached the opposite conclusion in 1774.341 Some Founders
considered copyright a matter of right;3 2 but in 1834, the Supreme
Others dismissed claims against the states. BV Eng'g v. U.C.L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1395,
1396-1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (state did not waive immunity to copyright suits, nor could
Congress in Copyright Act of 1976 validly abrogate state immunity); Lane v. First Nat'l
Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 168-72 (1st Cir. 1989) (Copyright Act of 1976 did not
include language sufficiently clear to abrogate state immunity); Rodriquez v. Tex.
Comm'n on the Arts, 199 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2000) (Fla. Prepaid invalidation of
Congressional protection of patents also applies to copyrights).
337. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
336. EDWARD C. WALTERSHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:
AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-1836, 70 (Fred B. Rothman &
Co., 1998).
337. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
338. Id. at xi. Chief Justice Marshall agreed. Evans v. Jordan, 2 F. Cas. 872, 873
(C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4564), quoted by WALTERSHEID, supra note 335, at 74.
339. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,658 (1834).
340. Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, cited in Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
at 665.
341. Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (1774), cited in Wheaton, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) at 655-56. For a discussion, see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 4.02[A] & [B], at 4-11 to 4-14.1 (Mathew Bender & Co., Inc.
2001).
342. WALTERSHEID, supra note 335, at 71 (quoting Annals of Congress (2d Cong., 2d
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Court firmly said that neither author nor inventor had a common law
right to protection, 3 and that copyrights and patents were rights
which Congress could create, if it chose.344 The Court left no doubt
where patents and copyrights would later fall under Justice Scalia's
test:
This right, as has been shown, does not exist at common law-it
originated, if at all, under the acts of Congress. No one can
deny that when the legislature are about to vest an exclusive
right in an author or inventor, they have the power to prescribe
the conditions on which such right shall be enjoyed .... This
principle is familiar, as it regards patent rights; and it is the
same in relation to the copyright of a book. 4'
2. The legislative solution
Now pending before both houses of Congress is the Intellectual
Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001.346 The bill would bar
States from obtaining remedies on patents, copyrights, and
trademarks issued after Jan. 1, 2002, unless the State proved that
before the infringement began, it had waived its immunity to similar
suits and that the waiver has continued in effect since then.347 States
would have until Jan. 1, 2004 to adopt their waivers.4 8 The bill would
apply to any patent that a State or State instrumentality had ever
owned, thereby preventing the States from evading the law by selling
the patent to a private party.3 49 The bill also would allow intellectual
property holders to sue State officials for monetary relief in cases
where a State's infringement of intellectual property rights amounted
to a denial of due process or to a taking of private property.5 °
The proposal has several strengths. It requires a State to
affirmatively declare that it is waiving its immunity, and that
requirement should eliminate the constructive waiver problem of
College Savings Bank. It gives States the burden of proving whether
or not they have waived immunity, eliminating the need for the lower
Sess.) 855 (1793) (Remarks of Rep. William Murray) (patents are matter of right)).
343. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 654-661.
344. Id. at 654-662.
345. Id. at 663-64 (emphasis added).
346. H.R. 3204, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001); S. 1611, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001). A
similar bill was introduced in 1999. See S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999).
347. H.R. 3204, 107th Cong. § 3(a)-(c) (2001).
348. Id.
349. Id. (there is an exception, however, for bona fide patent purchasers who neither
knew nor had reason to know that a State had once owned the patent).
350. Id. at § 5(a),(b).
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federal courts to inform the U.S. Justice Department every time a
State invokes immunity regarding intellectual property. It limits a
waiver's scope to federal intellectual property matters, making its
condition far more germane than the condition involved in South
Dakota v. Dole. It expressly discusses sovereign immunity, satisfying
Atascadero's requirement of an "unambiguously clear" statute. And
it gives a State that invokes immunity an opportunity to change its
mind.351 The bill may face strong political opposition, but if Congress
adopts it, I cannot foresee it would encounter any State sovereign
immunity problems.
C. The Bankruptcy Clause
1. The power and the problem
The Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o
establish.. .uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States." '352  Congressional power in this area is
"unrestricted and paramount." '353 But State sovereign immunity has
created major problems for the nation's bankruptcy system. In
general, a State's immunity enables it to seize and retain the debtor's
property at the expense of even secured creditors.354 If a State
pressures a bankrupt to pay his taxes before the bankruptcy court can
distribute his assets, sovereign immunity will prevent his creditors or
the bankruptcy trustee from reclaiming such a preferential transfer,"'
because reclamation would require taking money from the State
treasury.56  If a bankruptcy petition has been filed, so that an
automatic stay protects the debtor's property, and a State still seizes
that property,' sovereign immunity will prevent the bankruptcy court
351. Id. at § 112(b)(2).
352. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
353. Or at least it was in 1929. Compare Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265
(1929) and New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329, 333 (1933) (congressional power is
"supreme") with Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73 n.16 ("[n]o established tradition" of
federal court enforcement of bankruptcy statutes against states).
354. For a list of state conflicts with the bankruptcy system, see Laura B. Bartell,
Getting to Waiver-A Legislative Solution to State Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy after
Seminole Tribe, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 17, 39 n.134 (2000); and cases cited.
355. The Bankruptcy Code permits a trustee to "avoid" and recover any preferential
transfer a bankrupt (or near bankrupt) makes to any creditor, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000).
356. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
357. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2002) (creating automatic stay).
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from acting.3 8  Indeed, even if a bankruptcy court distributes a
bankrupt's assets and discharges her debts, it is not clear what action
the bankrupt can take to force a State to honor that order.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1978 59 attempted to address these
problems. It said that a State waived its immunity when it filed a
proof of claim against a bankrupt's estate:" in effect, that provision
offered a State access to the federal bankruptcy proceedings in return
for a waiver of its immunity. The Act also abrogated the sovereign
immunity of "any governmental unit, 36' albeit without any quid pro
quo. That general abrogation clause fell in 1989 because it did not
clearly declare Congress' intent to abrogate State immunity.362
In response, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 replaced the
1978 Act's insufficiently clear clause with Section 106(a), which said
that "sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit" in
regard to sixty sections of the Code. 363 But three years later, Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Fla. held that Congress lacked authority under the
Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate State immunity,364 and that
case's dicta on the Bankruptcy Clause365 persuaded some lower courts
to invalidate the new Section 106(a). 3' And in 1999, College Savings
Bank's denunciation of constructive waivers367 may have killed
358. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464.
359. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C.).
360. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1998) (amended 1994). If the state owed the bankrupt any
money, § 106(b) of the Act let the trustee setoff that amount against any taxes the
bankrupt owed the state.
361. 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1998) (amended 1994).
362. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't. of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 101-04 (1989).
363. Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106, § 113(a) (1994), 11 U.S.C. § 101(27) included
states in the meaning of "governmental unit."
364. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1997).
365. Id. at 72 n.16 ("it has not been widely thought" that the Bankruptcy Code
abrogated the states' sovereign immunity, nor is there an "established tradition" of
enforcing Bankruptcy Code provisions against the states.).
366. Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Penn. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred
Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133 F.3d 237, 242-45 (3rd Cir. 1998); Schlossberg v. Maryland
(In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc.), 119 F.3d 1140, 1144-47 (4th Cir.
1997), cert. denied sub nom. Schlossburg v. Md. Comptroller of Treasury, 523 U.S. 1015
(1998); La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co. (In re Fernandez), 123 F.3d
241, 243-44, 246 (5th Cir. 1997), amended on denial of rehearing, 130 F.3d 1138 (1997);
Mueller v. Idaho (In re Mueller), 211 B.R. 737, 740-41 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997); 2
COLLIER, WILLIAM MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 106.02[1]106-6 (Alan N.
Resnick & Henry J. Summer eds., 15th ed rev. 2001).
367. 527 U.S. at 676-86.
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Section 106(b), which says that a government's filing of a proof of
claim in a bankruptcy case "is deemed to have waived" immunity
regarding any claims against it that arose from the same transaction
6
In short, the law has changed since 1912, when the Supreme
Court said federal bankruptcy laws took "into consideration, we
think, the whole range of indebtedness of the bankrupt, national,
state, and individual, and assigns the order of payment. 3 69 A leading
bankruptcy treatise observes "the consequences of Seminole Tribe
seem to overwhelm the established balance among creditors by
placing state taxing authorities outside the jurisdiction of bankruptcy
court.... ,,370 While the treatise does suggest that bankruptcy courts
can enter discharge orders, 71 the heading to that chapter is quite
revealing: "Discharge Orders and Confirmation Orders Continue to
Be Effective But Are Not Enforceable Against States. 3 72 Meanwhile,
federal courts have ruled that States are immune from liability for
violating the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay and discriminatory
treatment provisions.373
368. 2 COLLIER, WILLIAM MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 106.02[3] at 106-12;
Terence K. Goebel, Comment, Obtaining Jurisdiction Over States in Bankruptcy
Proceedings After Seminole Tribe, 65 U.CHI. L. REV. 911, 919 (1998) (citing In re Creative
Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1147-48 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
unconstitutional Congressional attempt to make State conduct a waiver.); AER-Aerotron,
Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 104 F.3d 677, 681 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[p]ower to define waiver"
can be "functional equivalent of the power to abrogate.").
369. Guarantee Title & Trust Co. v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 224 U.S. 152, 160 (1912).
370. 2 COLLIER, WILLIAM MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 106.03[1][a] at 106-
17 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Summer eds., 15th ed rev. 2001).
371. 2 COLLIER, WILLIAM MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 106.03[1][b] at 106-
17 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Summer eds., 15th ed rev. 2001), citing Maryland v.
Antonelli Creditors' Liquidating Trust, 123 F.3d 777, 786-87 (4th Cir. 1997) (confirmation
order bound state taxing authorities because it was not part of suit against a state); Texas
v. Walker, 142 F.3d 813, 822 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1102 (1999) (discharge
order may be raised as affirmative defense in action brought by state against debtor).
372. 2 COLLIER, WILLIAM MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 106.03[1][b], at 106-
17. The treatise also warns that legislation under the 14th Amendment to abrogate state
sovereign immunity "may become necessary" if states refuse to recognize bankruptcy
actions. Section 106.03[4], at 106-22, 23.
373. In re Straight, 248 B.R. 403 (Bankr. 10th Cir. 2000) (dismissing action by debtor
for profits lost after state revoked certificate for company doing business withstate); In re
Burkhardt, 220 B.R. 837, 841-44 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1998) (bankruptcy court could not hear
debtor's suit against state for revoking his driver's license because of judgments and fines
bankruptcy court had discharged.); In re Christensen, 167 B.R. 213, 217-1-8 (Bankr. D. Or.
1994) (state immune from damages even for deliberate violation of discharge order).
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2. A judicial solution
Drawing on the work of attorney Leonard Gerson,374 the Sixth
Circuit's Bankruptcy Appeals Panel determined in 2001 that States
ceded their sovereignty when they agreed to the Constitution's
Bankruptcy Clause. 5 In re Hood argues:
(1) the first Bankruptcy Act was prompted by a desire to
override State use of imprisonment for debt and the uncertainty
caused by debtors' relief statutes of various States;376
(2) the Bankruptcy Clause's provision for national uniformity is
identical to that of the Naturalization Clause, which Hamilton said
overrode State sovereignty;
317
(3) the Bankruptcy Clause lets Congress impair the obligation of
contracts, while Art. I, §10 prohibits States from taking similar
action;1
71
(4) a dozen Supreme Court opinions recognize the authority of
federal bankruptcy courts over States;379 and
(5) Seminole Tribe's dicta on bankruptcy failed to consider the
incompatibility of State sovereign immunity with the bankruptcy
380process.
But Justices O'Connor and Scalia already have said Congress
may not use the Bankruptcy Clause to abrogate State sovereign
immunity,38' and Seminole Tribe's author still sits as Chief Justice.
The States need only two more votes to convert Seminole Tribe's
hasty dicta into a holding that will have profound affects on secured
creditors.
374. A Bankruptcy Exception to Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Limiting the
Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2000).
375. Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., (In re Hood) 262 B.R. 412 (Bankr. 6th
Cir. 2001).
376. Id. at 416-418.
377. Id. at 418-19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 152-53--- (Alexander
Hamilton)) (explaining that state sovereignty overridden when Constitution gives federal
government authority "to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and
totally contradictory and repugnant," such as power of Congress to provide uniform
naturalization rules).
378. Id. at 419 (quoting Bliemeister v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz. (In re Bliemeister), 251
B.R. 383, 389 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000)), affd on other grounds, Case No. 00-1557-PHX (D.
Ariz. Mar. 28, 2001).
379. Hood, 262 BR. at 419-23.
380. Id. at 423-26.
381. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 105, (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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3. The legislative solution: the limitations of induced waiver
At first glance, the Bankruptcy Clause seems to feature just the
type of gratuity that Justice Scalia discussed in College Savings Bank.
Congress noted in 1799 that it has no duty to adopt a bankruptcy
law,382 and for much of the nineteenth century, the United States did
not have such a law.383 Nor must the Bankruptcy Act cover all debtors
or creditors. Early Americans believed bankruptcy covered only
merchants and could not include farmers or mechanics.384
Accordingly, several commentators have suggested that
Congress can use its Bankruptcy Clause powers to favor States in
return for State waivers of immunity regarding bankruptcy
proceedings.8 This approach has several problems. First, it merely
382. 9 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 2670-71 (statement of Rep. Abraham Baldwin) (Jan. 15,
1799), quoted in 2 PHILIP B. KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, 2 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 621 (1987).
383. The first Bankruptcy Act was not adopted until.1800, Act of Feb. 21, 1800, ch. 19,
2 Stat. 19, and was repealed in 1803, Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248. The next was
introduced in Congress in 1820, CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 27 (Da Capo Press 1972) (1935), but did not become law for two decades. Act
of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440. It was repealed that same year. Act of March 3, 1843,
ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. A replacement appeared after the Civil War, Bankrupt Act of March 2,
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, and was repealed a decade later, June 7, 1878, 20 Stat. 99. The
fourth Act did not appear for another twenty years. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544, and only since then has a Bankruptcy Act continually been in place. HENRY
CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1 (1914).
384: WARREN, supra note 381, at 24, 27. Warren quotes three presidents who agreed.
See id. at 172 n.51, (quoting Jefferson letter to James Pleasants (Dec. 16, 1821), X
WRITING OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 198) (bankruptcy law should bind only town residents,
"leaving the agriculturalists" alone.); id. at 56 (quoting Martin Van Buren, Presidential
Special Message of Sept. 4, 1837) (urging that Congress confine scope of Bankruptcy Act
to banks); id. at 31 (quoting James Buchanan (no footnote provided)) (bankrupt law for
farmers would be "monster.").
Several members of the court shared those beliefs. See Adams v. Storey, 1 Fed. Cas. 141,
142, 1 Paine 79 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (Livingston, Circuit Justice) (bankruptcy laws operate
only on traders; broader bankruptcy law might be unconstitutional), quoted in Hanover
Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 184 (1902); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 195 (1819) (stating that bankruptcy law applies only to "traders," but unclear
who that includes.) (Marshall, C.J.).
385. Troy A. McKenzie, Note, Eleventh Amendment Immunity in Bankruptcy:
Breaking the Seminole Tribe Barrier, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199, 236-39 (2000), and Laura B.
Bartell, Getting to Waiver-A Legislative Solution to State Sovereign Immunity in
Bankruptcy After Seminole Tribe, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 17, 93-102 (2000).
Kenneth N. Klee et al. propose a variety of solutions, such as authorizing U.S. trustees to
sue on behalf of creditors wronged by a State's violation of bankruptcy rules, while
admitting these solutions would distort principles of federalism. State Defiance of
Bankruptcy Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1584-91 (1999) (citing U.S. ex rel Foulds v. Tex.
Tech, 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999)). They also suggest allowing a state's claim against
a bankrupt's assets only if the state has waived immunity regarding that claim and
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transfers the cost of sovereign immunity from some creditors to
others. For example, to protect secured creditors from States who
would otherwise pressure debtors into making preferential transfers,
Congress might encourage States to participate in bankruptcy
proceedings by giving State tax claims priority over all unsecured
creditors. This would protect secured creditors, but at the expense of
unsecured creditors.
Second, the suggested incentives give States little value. Longer
deadlines than private creditors receive386 and slightly advantageous
priorities over unsecured creditors pale in comparison to the
tremendous toll the Bankruptcy Code exacts on states. Even though
state tax departments are involuntary creditors, their priority in
bankruptcy ranks below all secured, voluntary creditors and seven
classes of unsecured creditors." Other than respect for federal law, it
is hard to see why a state should give up the many advantages of
immunity in return for an advantage over unsecured creditors. Quite
frankly, states already have far more incentive to bypass the
bankruptcy system than to participate in it. Conditioning their
participation in bankruptcy proceedings on a waiver of immunity
would give them even more incentive to stay outside the system.
In short, while Congressional power to condition various
benefits-regulatory authority, copyrights, patents, and trademarks-
can be used to encourage states to waive their immunity, the
Bankruptcy Clause does not offer the same opportunity. If the Court
rejects In re Hood's analysis of the Bankruptcy Clause, what can
Congress do to protect the secured creditors who finance corporate
America? That answer comes in the next section.
compulsory counterclaims. Klee, supra, at 1589-90.
386. States have 180 days longer than private creditors to file a proof of claim. 11
U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (2002). State tax claims that arise after bankruptcy proceedings begin
are treated as arising before they begun (thereby improving the state's priority). 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(i) (2002). State tax claims also have some priority over general unsecured debts. 11
U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) & (9) (2002).
387. Claims for taxes owed to any government rank below the claims of secured
creditors and below seven classes of unsecured debt, including administrative expenses
and unsecured claims arising after the bankruptcy commenced, employee claims for wages
and contributions to benefit plans, and certain claims by farmers, bank depositors, and
recipients of alimony or child support. 11 U.S.C. § 507a (2002).
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IV. Congressional Authority Over Federal Court Jurisdiction
vis-a-vis State Sovereign Immunity
A. The Problem and the Proposal
I now come to the most radical part of this Article. Congress'
power to condition monetary and non-monetary benefits can prevent
many-but not all-state abuses of sovereign immunity. From a
business perspective, the most serious remaining abuse is state
disruption of the bankruptcy system. From the perspective of most
citizens, the main problem is how sovereign immunity puts states
above the law and makes them unaccountable to their own citizens.
Concern about this aspect of state sovereign immunity is not
new. At the beginning of Federalist No. 45, fears of how the states
might abuse Americans caused James Madison to condemn State
sovereign immunity in the strongest terms." To Madison, the
doctrine was more than unwise, it was an offense against God:
Was then the American revolution effected, was the American
confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt,
and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the
people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety; but
that the governments of the individual states, that particular
municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of
power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of
sovereignty? We have heard of the impious3 89 doctrine in the
old world, that the people were made for kings, not kings for
the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the new, in
another shape, that the solid happiness of the people is to be
sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different
form? ... [A]s far as the sovereignty of the states cannot be
reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every
good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the
latter.39
Fortunately, the lessons of Dole and College Savings Bank offer
Congress an opportunity to effectively eliminate state use of the
doctrine. My final proposition is that Congress should use its Article
I and Article III powers over the jurisdiction of the lower federal
386. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
389. Samuel Johnson defined "impious" as "Irrelligious [sic]; wicked; profane; without
reverence of religion." JOHNSON'S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).
Noah Webster's definition was similar: "Irreverent towards the Supreme Being; wanting in
veneration for God and his authority; irreligious, profane...." NOAH WEBSTER, AN
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OFTHE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 106 (1828).
390. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 309 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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courts to condition a plaintiff state's access to all federal courts upon
its blanket waiver of sovereign immunity to all federal lawsuits. This
condition should be an element of subject matter jurisdiction, and
Congress should require U.S. District Courts to notify the U.S.
Attorney's office or the U.S. Attorney General if a state invokes
sovereign immunity.39 When that happened, all federal courts would
have to dismiss, with prejudice, all cases which that state or its agents
had filed.
B. Congressional Authority to Condition Access to Federal Court3"
1. Introduction
Article I gives Congress the power to "constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court," and Article III, Section 1 requires
Congress to vest the federal judicial power in a Supreme Court "and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." Congress possesses "the sole power of creating the
tribunals (inferior to the Supreme Court) for the exercise of judicial
power, and of investing them with jurisdiction, either limited,
concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in
the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper
for the public good." '393 This includes the authority to restrict the
jurisdiction of those lower federal courts.394
391. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2000) (requiring federal district court to inform U.S.
Attorney or U.S. Attorney General of any challenge to constitutionality of federal
statute).
392. I originally hoped that the federal judiciary itself could do this by 6ombining
abstention and equity's clean hands doctrine, but that hope will not come to pass.
The Supreme Court has used its equitable powers to create the abstention doctrines that
sometimes require federal courts to dismiss cases over which they have jurisdiction based
on diversity, Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the United States and tribes as
plaintiffs, Colo. River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), or federal
constitutional issues, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Meanwhile, equity long has
required those who seek it to come to court with clean hands. JOHN NORTON POMEROY,
2 A TREATISE ON EQuITY, § 397, at 90-91 (5th ed. 1941). How could a state which refuses
to follow federal law come into a federal court with clean hands? Unfortunately, the clean
hands doctrine is limited to wrongful conduct by a plaintiff in the same lawsuit or
transaction. Id. § 398, at 93, § 399, at 95, 97-98. It does not prevent a court from providing
equity "to a bad or faithless man or a criminal," unless he acted wrongly in the dispute
immediately before the court. Id. at 97.
393. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
394. See Kenne Co. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993) (Congress can define
jurisdiction of lower federal courts); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 401 (1973)
(Congress need not create lower federal courts nor vest them with all Article III
jurisdiction); Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 803, 833 (1966) (Congress may assign
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2. Excluding plaintiffs from federal courts on the basis of their identities
My proposal would restrict the federal court's jurisdiction on the
basis of a plaintiff's identity. Many statutes already use a party's
identity to grant jurisdiction,395 and at least four use it to restrict
jurisdiction.39 The Court itself restricted jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts in 1806, when it required complete diversity between
all plaintiffs and all defendants."
3. Excluding sovereign plaintiffs from federal court
Surprisingly, there is precedent for my proposal to exclude
plaintiff sovereigns (such as states) who, in other cases, have rejected
the authority of the federal courts.398
The closest precedent comes from Chief Justice William
federal issues to federal courts, state courts, or both); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S.
226, 234 (1922) (lower federal courts derive their jurisdiction wholly from Congress);
Carlyle Towers Condo. Ass'n. v. FDIC, 170 F.3d 301, 306 (2d Cir. 1999) (Congress may
deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over certain cases).
For example, the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not allow the lower federal courts to hear
federal question cases. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. Congress finally granted that
jurisdiction in 1875, Act of March 3, 1975, 18 Stat. 470, but until 1980, Congress prevented
federal questions involving less than a certain amount of money, a restriction removed by
the Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
395. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2002) (Foreign state defendants); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2002)
(Diversity); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1345 (2002) (United States or its officials); 28 U.S.C. § 1348
(2002) (Banking associations); 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (2002) (Diplomats), and 28 U.S.C. § 1362
(2002) (Tribes).
396. The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002), bars federal lawsuits against
State tax departments regarding tax collections. The Johnson Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1342
(2002), prohibits federal lawsuits against state administrative agencies that set utility rates.
Imprisoned inmates may not sue the United States or its officers for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody, unless they can show a physical injury. 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b)(2) (2002). Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2002) transfers jurisdiction over certain
cases involving Indians in some States from the federal to state courts.
397. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
398. I was tempted to include the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, which bars an
enemy nation from suing in any American court. Section 7(b), ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411
(codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 1) (1999). See Ex parte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510, 511 (1942)
(refusing to hear claim of Italian government). The prohibition does not apply to citizens
of enemy nations unless they give aid and comfort to the other side. Ex parte Kumezo
Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 75 & n.7, 76 (1942).
But to be fair, state defiance of federal court authority has not come close to armed
conflict since Governor Faubus' opposition to the Supreme Court's desegregation
decisions caused President Eisenhower to send troops to Little Rock Central High School.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 289-290 (N.Y. Univ. Press, 1983). And states which
have invoked their immunity to bar lawsuits against themselves still have recognized the
authority of federal courts to enjoin various state officials to take actions that will cost
significant sums of money.
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Rehnquist. In Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold v. Wold Eng'g,399
several tribes attacked a North Dakota statute which prevented them
from suing in North Dakota courts until they waived their tribal
immunity to all other civil disputes in those courts. ° The Court's
majority invalidated the statute for reasons my proposal avoids. The
statute left unconsenting tribes no other forum to present their
claims,"° while my idea would let a state sue in the courts of other
states. 2 The challenged statute also required tribes to give up tribal
law in favor of state law, even in subjects which "clearly encompass
areas of traditional tribal control."4 °3 Moreover, the law violated a
federal statute barring any state from abandoning jurisdiction over
tribal land.4'
But an unusual trio of justices understood the underlying fairness
of the North Dakota scheme. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Brennan and Stevens, wrote:
North Dakota law provides that in order for an Indian tribe
such as petitioner to avail itself of the jurisdiction of North
Dakota courts as a plaintiff, it must also accept the jurisdiction
of those courts when it is properly named as a defendant in
them .... [S]uch a rule ... would commend itself to most
people as eminently fair .... The requirement that a tribe
consent to the general civil jurisdiction of state courts as a quid
pro quo for access to those courts as a plaintiff seems entirely
fair and even-handed to me.40'
This quid pro quo theme, this idea of sovereigns trading benefits,
would appear again, of course, in South Dakota v. Dole, when Justice
399. 476 U.S. 877 (1986). I am indebted to Prof. Dennis Arrow for telling me of this
case.
400. Id. at 878, 880-81 (quoting and construing N.D. Century Code § 27-19.
401. Id. at 883, 889.
402. States could file disputes over interstate boundaries, water allocation, and
pollution in the courts of the defendant state. While this may seem unfair, the Supreme
Court has not hesitated to force other plaintiffs out of neutral federal courts into the
courts of a hostile sovereign. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976) (dismissing federal action by the United States and tribes to preempt
water rights of white citizens and requiring them to proceed before state judge elected by
same white citizens); Burford, 319 U.S. at 315. (dismissing diversity action by out-of-state
resident and requiring him to contest, in Texas state court, Texas administrative agency
decision in favor of Texan).
403. Three Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold, 476 U.S. at 889.
404. Id. at 885-87.
405. Id. at 893-94, 896-97 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Just as the constitutionality of my
proposal turns on Congress' discretionary authority over the creation and jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts, Justice Rehnquist based his arguments on the fact that Congress
has allowed, but not required, states to take jurisdiction over tribal country.
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Rehnquist held that Congress constitutionally could ask a state to
give up some control over alcohol in exchange for federal highway
funds.
Justice Rehnquist is not the only American judge, or legislator,
to recognize that a sovereign may place conditions on another
sovereign plaintiff's access to its courts. Long ago, the strongest
advocates of states' rights recognized the absurdity of expecting a
court to hear the complaints of a government which refused to
recognize that court's authority in other situations. A month before
Ft. Sumter, the legislature of the Confederate States of America
suspended all civil suits in which the United States were plaintiffs,4 °v
and Confederate states later banned suits filed by the federal
government or by Northern citizens,4 °8 causing huge losses to
Northern merchants and banks.4°
406. 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
407. The Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the Confederate States of America,
Act of Mar. 16, 1861, Stat. PC, I Sess., ch. 61, § 44, quoted in WILLIAM M. ROBINSON, JR.,
JUSTICE IN GREY: A HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CONFEDERATE
STATES OF AMERICA 511968 (1941).
408. Robinson, supra note 404, at 84. The author cites a Florida statute of Feb. 14,
1861, barring state courts from hearing actions brought by citizens of non-slave holding
states, directing them to dismiss pending suits by Northern plaintiffs, and ordering them to
quash existing judgements held by Northerners. Other states' courts acted without
legislation. In April 1861, a trial court in northern Georgia dismissed sixteen suits filed by
Northerners. Id. at 84 n.38. See also id. at 625 (stating that district courts of the
Confederation itself recognized war terminated rights "of other U.S. citizens to judicial aid
or comfort" until North recognized the Confederacy). The ban on suits filed by Northern
citizens, not just those filed by the federal government or Northern States, went beyond
my proposal, which would not affect a recalcitrant state's citizens.
I do not know if Northern courts responded similarly. A WESTLAW search, ti(Alabama
Arkansas Florida Georgia Kentucky Mississippi "North Carolina" "South Carolina"
Tennessee Texas) & da(aft 1860 & bef 1868), produced only four cases with Confederate
states as named plaintiffs, and all of those cases reached judgment after the war. The
North's Confiscation Acts said nothing about closing courts. See Act to Confiscate
Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319 § 1 (Aug. 6, 1861); An Act
to Suppress Insurrection, to Punish Treason and Rebellion, to Seize and Confiscate the
Property of Rebels, and for Other Purposes, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589, 589-91, §§ 5, 7, 9 (July
17, 1862); An Act to Provide for the Collection of Abandoned Property and For the
Prevention of Frauds in Insurrectionary Districts Within the United States, ch. 120, 12
Stat. 820, § 3 (Mar. 3, 1863) (permitting any person to present claims to property seized by
federal forces during the war within two years after "suppression of rebellion").
409. President Abraham Lincoln charged, "There are no Courts or officers to whom
the citizens of other States may apply for the enforcement of their lawful claims against
the citizens of the insurgent States," and he referred to estimates of $200 million in lost
debts. Pres. Lincoln, Message of Dec. 3, 1861, quoted in CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 180 n.4 1972 (1935). Warren also quoted the
NEW YORK TRIBUNE as claiming that New York merchants lost the same amount in a
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C. The First Obstacle: Is Access to a Federal Court Enough of a
Bargaining Chip?
How will states respond if Congress conditions access to federal
courts on a waiver of sovereign immunity? That depends on how a
state values its ability to sue in federal court, and that depends on the
number and importance of the federal cases states file. Obviously, a
state files most of its cases in its own courts: criminal prosecutions,
administrative agency efforts to enforce statutes and regulations,
ordinary contract, property, and tort actions, and, thanks to today's
long-arm jurisdiction statutes, actions against out-of-state
corporations. That leaves few federal cases: disputes involving
exclusive federal jurisdiction, challenges to federal statutes and
regulations, and actions against other states.
Unfortunately, the federal courts do not keep separate statistics
for cases filed by states,"1  and computerized searches only find
published opinions.41 A search for California, Oklahoma, and North
Carolina (states diverse in size, population, and location) for 1998 and
1999 produced only twenty published federal court opinions in which
those states were named plaintiffs.412
single night. NEW YORK TRIBUNE, Sept. 18, 1862, quoted in WARREN, at 180 n.4.
410. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
ANN. REP. 105-466 (1989) (detailed statistical tables).
411. WESTLAW's description of the scope of its ALLFEDS database says this database
includes "documents released for publication in West Federal Reporters and other
publications.., and also includes 'quick opinions' (cases available online prior to West
advance sheets... and opinions that are not scheduled to be reported by West Group.)"
412. A June 12, 2000, WESTLAW search for the names of California, Oklahoma, and
North Carolina in the titles of cases produced 1307 hits. Most were criminal prosecutions,
habeas corpus petitions, actions against companies incorporated in the relevant states, or
actions in which States or their agencies were defendants.
Eighteen cases had been filed in federal court by states or state agencies. They were:
CFIC & Comm'r of Cal. v. Topworth Int'l, Ltd., 205 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1999) (joint
federal/state action to enforce federal and state commodity futures trading statutes); Hyatt
(N.C. Dep't. of Human Res.) v. Apfel, 195 F.3d 188, 189 (4th Cir. 1999) (suit to require
U.S. Social Security Director to follow circuit precedent in social security cases); Kaiser
Found. Health Plan, Inc. (& Cal. Dep't. of Health Serv.) v. Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Co.,
194 F.3d 1327 (table) (Fed. Cir. 1998) (dismissed per stipulation); Nat'l Ass'n. of State
Credit Union Supervisors v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 188 F.3d 228, 229 (4th Cir. 1999)
(challenge by N.C. and Kan. to federal regulations); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel
(PUC of Cal.) v. F.C.C., 183 F.3d 393, 393 (5th Cir. 1999) (state utility commission
challenged federal agency order); In re Dep't. of Energy Stripper Well Litigation (Cal. and
thirteen other states), 206 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 2000) (which identifies several states as
plaintiffs, 206 F.3d at 1347 n.1); Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 177 F.3d 1126, 1128 (9th
Cir. 1999) (challenge by two state university medical centers to policy of U.S. Dep't. of
Health and Human Services); Cal. Dep't. of Social Serv. v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 1019, 1019-20
(9th Cir. 1999) (appeal of Secretary of Health and Human Service's disapproval of state
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This suggests that continued access to federal courts does not
give Congress much bargaining leverage, although that should
weaken any State claim of coercion.
On the other hand, States have used federal litigation to protect
important state interests."' And without access to a federal court, a
State would have to bring actions regarding interstate boundaries,
water allocation, or pollution in its opponent's home courts.
I cannot predict how States would choose between immunity and
access to federal court. But giving them the opportunity would
provide an interesting test. The Rehnquist Court has carefully listed
program); Okla. ex rel Dep't. of Pub. Safety v. U.S, 161 F.3d 1266, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 1998)
(attack on Driver's Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2099, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 2721-25); Long Beach (Cal.) v. Exxon Corp., 155 F.3d 570, 1998 WL 382739, at
2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (state and city attack on federal charges made under Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904); Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal. v. Fed. Energy
Regulatory Comm'n, 143 F.3d 610, 612-14 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (tariff dispute re natural gas);
California ex rel Cal. Dep't. of Health Serv. v. Besone, 141 F.3d 1179, 1998 WL 105670
(9th Cir. 1998) (action to re release of hazardous substances); North Carolina ex rel James
E. Long, Comm'r of Ins. v. Cooper, 1998 WL 178374, at *5 (4th Cir. 1998) (suit for refund
of federal taxes paid on behalf of insolvent insurance company); California ex rel Cal.
Dep't. of Toxic Substance Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 784, 784 (9th Cir. 1998) (action to
recover cleanup costs); California v. Randtron, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1266 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(environmental action against polluter); Cal. Dep't. of Health Serv. v. Babbitt, 46 F. Supp.
2d 13, 15, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) (environmental dispute against U.S. Secretary of Interior);
California ex rel Sacramento Metro Air Quality Dist. v. U.S., 29 F. Supp. 652, 653 (E.D.
Cal. 1998) (action against U.S. Air Force base for violating federal environmental
statutes); Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1108-10 (S.D. Cal.
1998) (action under Coastal Management Zone Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1451, 1456(c)(1)).
Two others were filed by states in their own courts and then removed by the defendants:
State Ins. Fund v. Ace Transp., 195 F.3d 561, 563-64 (10th Cir. 1999) (action by state
workers compensation insurance fund against employers for unpaid premiums);
Oklahoma v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d 1244, 1244 (10th Cir. 1998) (action
against bond company for violation of federal and state organized crime statutes).
413. Obviously, state universities that hold patents or copyrights can protect them only
in federal court. See, e.g., Goldie Blumenstyk, Patent Ruling Gives U. of Colorado a Shot
at Millions in Damages, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (July 28, 2000) at 49.
(Colorado Health Sciences Center seeking $200 million in damages for private firms'
alleged violation of Center's patent).
Landmark federal cases filed by States include Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 833, 836 n.7 (consolidated with California v. Usery, case No. 74-879) (invalidating Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq); South Carolina v.
Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984) (attacking constitutionality of federal tax on state bonds); New
York v. United States., 502 U.S. 144, 154 (1992) (invalidating federal statute requiring
states not participating in interstate compacts to take title to all nuclear waste produced
within their boundaries); ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 498 (1988) (at
states' request, enjoining construction of $3.2 billion coal slurry pipeline); Oklahoma v.
U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 133 (1947) (challenging constitutionality of Hatch
Act, § 12(a), 53 Stat. 1147, 54 Stat. 767).
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the ways plaintiffs can work around State sovereign immunity, 414 as if
to minimize the damage that doctrine inflicts on Americans. If that
suggestion is correct, and state sovereign immunity does not prevent
Americans from obtaining justice, then states should see little
advantage in keeping it. Instead, they will prefer to waive their
immunity and retain access to federal courts. But if few states waive
immunity, then we will have solid evidence that the Court's lists of
limitations on state immunity are more for show than for real.15
D. The Second Obstacle: Removal
The removal process 416 requires a small exception to my proposal.
Congress is "constitutionally fully free" to determine what cases may
be removed from federal to state courts.417 But if Congress
conditioned a plaintiff state's access to federal court, what should
happen when a state sues in its own court and the private defendant
removes the case? Remanding the case to state court because the
state is the plaintiff would deprive the private defendant of its access
to federal court. So we need to let private defendants remove cases
filed by states. That poses no problem, since the right to remove
depends on the will of Congress.
E. The Third Obstacle: the Original Jurisdiction Clause
So far, I have discussed only Congressional authority to cut off
plaintiff States' access to the lower federal courts. That is because
Article III, Section 1 gives Congress discretion to create lower federal
courts, while it mandates the creation of a Supreme Court.
Furthermore, Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 (the "Original
Jurisdiction" clause) says "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
414. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754-57 (listing limits on and exceptions to state
immunity); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (listing ways to enforce federal law despite
state immunity).
415. To their credit, when the Court declared that states were immune from litigation
under Title I of the Americans with Disability Act, several states began efforts to waive
their immunity. Board of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). See Several
States Respond to Garrett Decision, Consider Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 70
U.S.L.W. 2003-04 (2001) (describing waiver by Minnesota and similar efforts by New York
and California).
416. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2002).
417. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,107 (1977) (quoting Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808, 833 (1966)).
418. CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 38, at 223 (1994)
(citing Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877)); 14A WRIGHT, MILLER,
AND COOPER, § 3721 n.2.
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public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
Party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." The clause
is self-executing, 19 although Congress also has provided for statutory
implementation.420 Now, my problem is obvious. Cutting off state
access to the inferior federal courts merely would cause states to
overwhelm the high Court,'21 and a pro-state Court might assign the
flood of state-initiated litigation to special masters who were
sympathetic to state interests. 2 So, would Congress be able to limit
the Court's original jurisdiction over states?
On some occasions, the Court has said "probably not.4 123 But on
other occasions, Congress and the Court have recognized that the
Original Jurisdiction clause's apparently absolute grant of jurisdiction
is far from absolute. Congress has split the Court's original
jurisdiction in two, giving the Court exclusive jurisdiction over
disputes between two or more states424 and concurrent jurisdiction
with the lower federal courts over controversies regarding
ambassadors, between the United States and a state, and by a state
against a citizen of another state.
The Court has upheld this division426 and created several
419. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) (citing Kentucky v. Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66, 96 (1860)); Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 492 (1854);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 332 (1816).
See also 17 WRIGHT, COOPER & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4043, at
182-83 (1988 & Supp. 2001); JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
I 402.02[2][b], at 402-24 (2001).
420. The first statute to do so was the Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch.
20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 80. Codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (2001).
421. Since 1961, the court has handled about three original jurisdiction cases a year.
Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court's Management of Its
Original Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 207-215 (1993).
422. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a).
423. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. at 66 ("extremely doubtful" that Congress can
limit Court's original jurisdiction); 17 WRIGHT, supra note 416, § 4043, at 182, 185 (citing
dicta from Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 300 (1888) and South Carolina v.
Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 398 (1984) (O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Powell, JJ., concurring); 22
MOORE, supra note 416, 402.02[2][b], at 402-24.
This is reinforced by Article III's structure. Section 2's grant of appellate jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court includes "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations, as the
Congress shall make." But Section 2's grant of original jurisdiction mentions no
exceptions.
424. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
425. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
426. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 78 & n.1 (1992) (noting that the Court has
never questioned the constitutionality of the division); California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. at
65; Ames v. Kansas ex rel Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 464-69 (1884); Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S.
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exceptions of its own. It will not accept a case in which a citizen of a
plaintiff state is a defendant,' 27 nor a suit in which a state sues its own
citizens.42 More broadly, the Court routinely has used discretion in
deciding whether to hear actions between states.429 That discretion
has been based on several factors: the seriousness of the dispute,430 the
presence of clear and convincing evidence, '31 and the lack of an
alternative forum.32 The Court's reluctance to hear state cases has
252, 258-59 (1884); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 722 (1838).
Prof. Pfander notes that the first Congress adopted this division and the Court approved it.
James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction in State-Party
Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 564 (1994) (citing the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73,
sections 13 and 9); id. at 564 (citing United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.D.
Pa. 1793) and other cases). He also points out that Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 258-59
(1884), found that the Framers did not intend to prevent Congress from developing the
concurrent jurisdiction exception. Pfander, 82 CAL. L. REV. at 620-21.
427. 22 MOORE, supra note 416, T 402.02[2][a], at 402-24, citing California v. S. Pac.
Co., 157 U.S. 229, 261-62 (1895).
428. 17 WRIGHT, supra note 416, § 4046, at 214, citing Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co.,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 553 (1870).
The Court also has excluded cases in which the state is a named party, but not the real
party in interest, such as suits involving the governor. Vincent L. McKusick, Discretionary
Gatekeeping: the Supreme Court's Management of Its Original Jurisdiction Docket Since
1961, 45 MAINE L. REV. 185, 194 (1993) (citing Puerto Rico v. Iowa, 464 U.S. 1034
(1984)). It also has refused to hear cases that include a state but lack a federal question,
diversity, or other justification for federal jurisdiction. California v. S. Pac. Co., 157 U.S.
229, 257-58 (1895); 17 WRIGHT, supra note 416, § 4043, at 176, and cases cited therein; 22
MOORE, supra note 416, TT 402.02[1][c], 402-10 and 402-12.
429. E.g., Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 77 (1992) (court has discretion to decline
jurisdiction even in actions between states, depending on seriousness of issue and
availability of other forum); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 450-54 (1992) (court
must use original jurisdiction "sparingly," even in disputes between states); South Carolina
v. Regan, 465 U.S. 396, 401 (1984) (court must use "sound discretion" to protect self from
flood of original jurisdiction litigation); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493,
499 (1971); United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973) (court will use original
jurisdiction "sparingly.").
A major concern behind the use of this discretion is the fear that original jurisdiction cases
would prevent the Court from attending to its appellate responsibilities. Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1971); Massachusetts v. Missouri., 308
U.S. 1, 19 (1939); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972).
430. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S.
437, 450-54 (1992); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 396, 400-01 (1984); Illnois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374
(1921).
431. North Dakota v. Minnesota., 263 U.S. at 374.
432. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. at 77; Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. at 450-
54; South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. at 400-01; Illinois. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at
93-94; Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19 (1939); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263
U.S. at 374.
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been so strong that it has used the alternative forum factor to decline
jurisdiction when a similar dispute between private parties has been
pending elsewhere.433
In addition, Professors Ahkil Reed Amar and James Pfander
have argued that Congress can limit or eliminate the Court's original
jurisdiction in cases involving states. Prof. Amar uses the structure of
Article III's second section to reach that conclusion. He argues that
Section 2's description of the federal judicial power repeatedly says
the high Court has original jurisdiction over "all Cases" involving
ambassadors, federal questions, and admiralty cases, while it does not
use that phrase in conjunction with cases in which the state is a party.
... He concludes that the necessary and proper clause permits the
court to limit or eliminate the Court's original jurisdiction over cases
in which a state is a party.435 Prof. Pfander takes a different approach
to reach the same conclusion. He contends that the Framers intended
the original jurisdiction clause to permit the federal government to
enforce its law against the states in federal court,436 so that the clause
creates a "relatively unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity. '
So whether we look at what Congress has done, what the Court
has said, or what the Founders intended, the Original Jurisdiction
clause would not prevent Congress from restricting plaintiff state
access to federal courts. I have no illusions about what today's Court
would do if Congress placed a condition on state access to the Court's
original jurisdiction. At the same time, however, the Court's own
precedents suggest another answer.
While the Court probably will not let Congress limit the Court's
original jurisdiction, Congress can change the Court's rules of
procedure. In 1796, the Court recognized that its authority to set its
rules of procedure was subject to Congressional control.38 In 1854,
Chief Justice Taney agreed, saying that Congress "had undoubtedly
433. McKusick, supra note 418, at 201 (citing Louisiana v. Mississippi, 488 U.S. 990,
990 (1988) (White, J., dissenting)) (describing how Court denied original jurisdiction when
Louisiana had intervened in Louisiana state court litigation between private parties over
Louisiana state boundaries); Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794, 797 (1976) (denying
original jurisdiction in favor of pending litigation involving Arizona utility companies re
same federal constitutional questions in New Mexico state court).
434. Ahkil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 478-82 (1989).
435. Id. at 482.
436. Pfander, supra note 417, at 558-61, 581, 592-94.
437. Id. at 581.
438. Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 320 (1796).
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the right to prescribe the process and mode of proceeding" in original
jurisdiction cases.439  Furthermore, the Court itself has raised
standards of proof for plaintiff States in original jurisdiction cases. A
plaintiff State can invoke the Court's original jurisdiction only if it
produces "clear and convincing evidence" that it has suffered a
serious injury."' Other cases have imposed this "clear and convincing
evidence" requirement to resolve the merits of original jurisdiction
suits before the Court."1
In short, to discourage a State from trying to use the Court's
original jurisdiction to evade a statute limiting access to lower federal
courts, Congress should follow the Court's own lead and impose a
very high burden of proof on States involved in original jurisdiction
cases. Again, that will not completely block plaintiff States from
access to federal courts, but it may sufficiently discourage State use of
the original jurisdiction clause so to make a blanket waiver of
immunity sufficiently attractive to a State's government.
V. " .... the more efficient Government of the Rebel States."
My proposal to limit State access to federal courts may sound
439. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478, 491-92 (1854).
440. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 501 & n.4 (1971) (to reduce
number of interstate pollution original jurisdiction cases, Court should "saddle the party
seeking relief with an unusually high standard of proof...");
Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 393 (1944) (court will not intervene on behalf of
complaining state unless state's case has been "fully and clearly proved");
Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1934) (state may sue another in Supreme Court
only if it alleges "facts that are clearly sufficient to call for a decree in its favor"; state has
burden to "fully and clearly establish all essential elements of its case...").
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 669 (1931) (state burden is one of "clear and
convincing evidence... [and] much greater than that generally required to be borne by
one seeking an injunction in a suit between private parties");
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 374 (1923) (Same);
New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921) (Same);
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520-22 (1906).
See also South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 396, 400 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 17
WRIGHT, supra note 416, § 4054, at 281 ("[T]he Court frequently responds to the difficult
nature of original jurisdiction cases by requiring that claims be proved by a high standard
of evidence.").
441. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 591 (1993) ("Clear and convincing
evidence"); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 316, 316 (1984); Idaho ex rel Evans v.
Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1027 (1983) (dismissing claim by Idaho for failing to show clear
and convincing need for apportionment of fishing rights); Colorado v. New Mexico, 459
U.S. 176, 187, 188 n.3 (1982) (court will divert water between states only if state shows
"clear and convincing evidence" that benefits of diversion will outweigh harm).
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radical, but the Court already has approved a similar action Congress
took some time ago.
In the 1976 case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court held that
Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gave Congress authority to
override Eleventh Amendment immunity.2 Justice Rehnquist's
opinion drew on cases dating back to 1880, which upheld "intrusions
by Congress, acting under the Civil War amendments, into the
judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States.""' 3 Since Fitzpatrick, the Court repeatedly has
listed Section 5 as a limitation on State sovereign immunity." For my
purposes, this is important because it means that when the States
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and gave Congress authority to
override their immunity, in effect, they waived their immunity,
subject to Congressional action.
And what prompted all of the former Confederate States to
waive their immunity by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment? The
answer appears in "[a]n Act to provide for the more efficient
Government of the Rebel States," especially sections 5 and 6:
WHEREAS no legal State governments or adequate protection
for life or property now exists in the rebel States of Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama,
Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas; and whereas it is
necessary that peace and good order should be enforced in said
States until loyal and republican State governments can be
legally established: Therefore,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That said rebel
States shall be divided into military districts and made subject
to the military authority of the United States as hereinafter
prescribed ....
SEC. 2, And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the
President to assign to the command of each of said districts an
officer of the army, not below the rank of brigadier-general, and
to detail a sufficient military force to enable such officer to
perform his duties ....
SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That when the people of any
one of said rebel States shall have formed a constitution of
government in conformity with the Constitution of the United
442. 427 U.S. 445, 453-56 (1976).
443. Id. at 455.
444. Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (adoption of Fourteenth Amendment "required the States
to surrender a portion of [their] sovereignty."); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (Fourteenth
Amendment "fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the
Constitution.").
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States in all respects, framed by a convention of delegates
elected by the male citizens of said State, twenty-one years old
and upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition...
and when such constitution shall be ratified by a majority of the
persons voting on the question of ratification who are qualified
as electors for delegates, and Congress shall have approved the
same, and when said State, by a vote of its legislature elected
under said constitution, shall have adopted the amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, proposed by the Thirty-
ninth Congress, and known as article fourteen, and when said
article shall have become a part of the Constitution of the
United States, said State shall be declared entitled to
representation in Congress, and senators and representatives
shall be admitted therefrom on their taking the oath prescribed
by law ....
SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That, until the people of said
rebel States shall be by law admitted to representation in the
Congress of the United States, any civil governments which may
exist therein shall be deemed provisional only, and in all
respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States
at any time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the
445
same ....
In other words, Congress imposed a de facto waiver of immunity
as a condition to the Southern States' representation in Congress-
and, indeed, their very existence as states. And Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
written by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, upheld the results of
that condition. Fitzpatrick does not complain of coercion; it does not
suggest that the ratification votes of the Confederate States, then
occupied by federal troops, were in any way involuntary.
When I read the Rehnquist Court's decisions on state sovereign
immunity, on the abstention doctrines, and on Congressional
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, I sometimes wonder
who surrendered at Appomattox Courthouse. Again and again, the
Court has ignored Madison's warnings and placed the interests of
states above the interests of the American people. But when
Congress unites Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer and South Dakota v. Dole with Justice Scalia's clarifications in
College Savings Bank, then State sovereign immunity will finally
assume its proper role in the American legal system.
445. Act of March 2,1867, ch. 153, §§ 1, 2, 5 and 6, 14 Stat. 428, 428-29.
The ten named states approved the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Act of June 22, 1868,
ch. 69, 15 Stat. 72 (admitting State of Arkansas to representation in Congress); Act of June
25, 1868, ch. 70, 15 Stat. 73 (admitting States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Alabama, and Florida to representation in Congress).
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